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The moving Finger writes, and having writ, moves on. But it may be that having written,
what we write is soon erased.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Historical Background
The principle of "freedom of contract," popular among contract
theorists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, rests on the
belief that respect for personal autonomy is a necessary complement
to both the liberal political state and a free-market economy. 2 More
precisely, if the government enforces private agreements voluntarily
entered into by parties seeking to order their business and personal
affairs, then individual liberty is preserved, 3 equality of opportunity is
ensured,4 and the maximization of societal wealth can be achieved. 5
1. Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1963) (citation omitted).
2. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1769 (1997) (asserting that the principle of freedom
of contract is supported by both "the liberal-individualistic moral ideology and the utilitarian-
economic ideology"). For a complete analysis of this subject, see generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
There is also a constitutional dimension to the notion of freedom of contract. Article I of the
United States Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Activist courts of the early twentieth
century used freedom of contract to strike social legislation on substantive due process grounds;
the seminal case in the area is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional
a statute that prohibited a contract between employer and employee requiring an employee to
work over sixty hours per week and ten hours per day). For a modern application of this doctrine
in a context not involving the validity of legislation, see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 519 (1974), and Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). See also G. Richard
Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1993).
It should be specified, too, that freedom of contract is a principle with two component parts.
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV.
821, 828 (1992). One part is the freedom to contract, the more common notion that people should
be free to enter into whatever agreements they mutually desire. Id. The second, less familiar
part, is freedom from contract. Id. This aspect dictates that courts should not impose contractual
obligations on parties without their consent. See id. For another discussion of this dichotomy, see
also Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982).
3. See Zamir, supra note 2, at 1769 ("According to deontological liberalism, every person is
the best judge of her own aims, and of the means by which they are to be achieved. Society
should respect the autonomy of every individual and refrain from dictating any conception of 'the
good life.' ").
4. Id. ("Contrary to regimes in which power and wealth are distributed according to social
or political status, a free-market regime provides equality of opportunity for each person to make
any contract she wishes and thereby improve her position.").
5. Id. at 1770 ("The rules of supply and demand bring about an optimal allocation of
resources precisely when individuals seek their own utility and wealth.").
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Notwithstanding its waning acceptance, 6 freedom of contract has been
offered as an appropriate foundational approach to legislation as
diverse as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("U.C.I.T.A."),7 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,8 and state
limited liability acts. 9
6. Freedom of contract never meant that courts could not intervene to protect parties from
the consequences of unfortunate or unfair transactions. Doctrines such as fraud, duress, and
undue influence have always been available to shield individuals from the ill effects of their acts.
In fact, the inappropriate use of these devices is what led Karl Llewellyn and the drafters of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "the Code") to codify for the first time the
concept of unconscionability.
[Section 2-302] is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such
policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation
of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by determinations that the clause is contrary to
public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. [Section 2-302] is intended to
allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular
clause therein....
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002).
Now more than ever, though, courts are inclined to consider public policy and societal context
tending to hem in the freedom to bargain. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-99
(1981) (stating that a court may decline to enforce a contract or term on public policy grounds as
well as setting forth those clauses and contracts that are superseded by societal interests); Eric
T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as Lease: Habitability Protections and the Low.
Income Purchaser, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 311 (1987) (suggesting that "it is appropriate for courts
to weigh the social context of the contract as heavily as the exact contract language"). G.H.L.
Fridman wrote:
The tendency of the modern law... is away from the principle of freedom of
contract.... The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced the golden age of
contract. Are we seeing a gradual decline in the importance of contractual relations, a
revulsion from the supremacy of the individual and the individual's will?
Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the 'Rise and Fall', 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 266
n.9 (1999) (quoting G.H.L. Fridman, Freedom of Contract, 2 OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 22 (1967)
(arguing that modern law has moved away from freedom of contract)).
Also not without restriction is freedom from contract. For example, U.C.C. section 4-103(b)
departs from the rule that a contract between two parties cannot bind a third party by stating:
"Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and the like have the
effect of agreements ... whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested in items
handled." U.C.C. § 4-103(b) (2002).
7. U.C.I.T.A. resulted from the aborted project to draft a new Article 2B of the U.C.C. This
article would have governed all contracts for the sale, licensing, development, distribution,
maintenance, documentation, and support of computer software. Instead of incorporating this
uniform law within the U.C.C. as originally planned, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("N.C.C.U.S.L.") decided in 1999 that it would be more appropriate to
promulgate it as a freestanding statute for adoption by the states. For a brief history of Article
2B and the reasons why the project was transformed into U.C.I.T.A., see Fred H. Miller &
Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B's New Uniform: A Free-Standing Computer Information Transactions
Act, U.C.C. BULL., June 1999, at 1, 2-4. The Prefatory Note to U.C.I.T.A. makes clear that its
underlying principle is freedom of contract. It states that the statute "adheres to the norm of
[U.S.] commercial law: freedom of contract is the philosophy of commerce." U.C.I.T.A., Prefatory
Note (1999); see also U.C.I.T.A. § 1-106 (1999). The full text of U.C.I.T.A. is available online. See
Carol A. Kunze, UCITA Online: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
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Even more generally, freedom of contract means that parties
should be free to choose, as a strategic matter, the legal rules they
consider to be most beneficial given their interests. 10 The most
familiar example of this strategy is a contract term that specifies that
the parties' bargain is to be governed by the positive law of a given
jurisdiction. 1 However, the fact that a policy in favor of enforcing
contractual choice-of-law clauses might have significant instrumental
value for realizing the right to personal autonomy and other core
8. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)). The Supreme Court has recognized freedom of contract as one of the
fundamental policies on which the Act is grounded. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,
103 (1970); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (stating:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party .... ).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1999) ("It is the policy of this chapter to
give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited
liability company agreements."). Indeed, scholars describe the Delaware version as based on
freedom-of-contract principles. See Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Delaware Limited
Liability Companies, 6 No. 11 INSIGHTS 32 (1992).
[A] fundamental principle underlying the [Delaware] Act is that of freedom of
contract. The Act's basic approach is to permit members to have the broadest possible
discretion in drafting their limited liability company agreements and to furnish
answers only in situations in which the members have not expressly made provision
in their limited liability company agreement.
10. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has made the point that parties should be able
to choose for themselves the law that will govern their contract. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton,
106 U.S. 124, 136-37 (1882) ('The law we are in search of, which is to decide upon the nature,
interpretation, and validity of the engagement in question, is that which the parties have, either
expressly or presumptively, incorporated into their contract as constituting its obligation.");
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 48 (1825) ("[I]n every forum a contract is governed by the law
with a view to which it was made.").
11. A typical choice-of-law clause might read: "This agreement shall be governed by, and
construed in accordance with, the law of the State of New York." Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva
Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 423 n.10 (1991). U.S. courts have also condoned contractual depecage,
which permits parties to agree that the law of different states will apply to different potential
issues in a single case. See, e.g., Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317,
328 (Iowa 1977).
Apart from choice-of-law clauses, there are alternative strategies that parties may use to
choose the "law" that governs their relationship. They could, for example, choose a body of
commonly accepted principles or rules such as the Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, drafted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT') in 1994. They could also incorporate by reference written trade rules codified by
national or local trade associations. This Article is concerned only with the parties' choice of
positive law.
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elements of liberalism 12 does not necessarily mean that courts will
recognize and protect the parties' choice without restrictions. 13 In fact,
their unwillingness to do so has had a long history. Indeed, early-
twentieth-century commentators attacked the very concept of party
autonomy in choice of law as unacceptable "private legislation."V
After all, they wondered, how could private individuals "displace the
law of the place where their acts are done by exercise of any choice of
their own?"15 This recognition of territorial sovereignty accounts for
the absence of any provisions in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of
Laws, addressing the freedom of contracting parties to choose the law
that will govern their relationship.' 6
In this light, the decision by the drafters of the U.C.C. to
include a general choice-of-law provision that provides for limited
12. For a brief overview of many of the benefits of enforcing contractual choice of law, see
Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 (1993). Moreover, as this Article
will explain, choice-of-law clauses will grow in importance as the twenty-first century unfolds.
See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
13. Most writers who have supported party autonomy have argued for some type of
geographic limitation. The following is an apt summary of the reasons why:
One important objection to giving the parties this broader choice is that it would place
upon the court which tried the case the additional burden of ascertaining the foreign
'law' (domestic rule) in question. Another is that there would be in many types of
situations a greater likelihood that the selection made by the parties would infringe
upon the 'public policy' of the states with which the transaction has substantial
connections. This would clearly be true in the usury cases, and there are accordingly
decisions invalidating a choice by the parties of the 'law' of a state with which the
transaction in question had no substantial connection .... The reasons for limiting
the choice of the parties to the 'law' of states with which the transaction has some
'substantial connection' are purely practical: to allow a wider choice would place a
possibly inconvenient burden on the courts of the forum and perhaps too often lead to
a clash with the public policy of the states concerned.
WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 412, 418
(1942).
14. See Ribstein, supra note 12, at 261.
15. H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 232 (1927). Judge Learned Hand put it this way:
People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may of course
incorporate any provisions they wish into their agreements-a statute like anything
else-and when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the whole, so far as they
can. But an agreement is not a contract, except as the law says it shall be, and to try
to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation,
and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no more than with whether
their acts are torts or crimes.
E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).
16. Joseph Beale, the Reporter for the First Restatement, left little doubt that he shared
Learned Hand's concern that permitting party autonomy in choice of law would give "permission
to the parties to do a legislative act." Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a
Contract?, 23 HARv. L. REV. 260, 260 (1910); see also Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of
Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination,
82 COLUrM. L. REV. 1659, 1674 (1982).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:57
party autonomy can be seen as a major innovation in the law. 17
Nevertheless, it was entirely consistent with the drafters' own
embrace of freedom of contract as a fundamental Code principle.' 8
Section 1-105 provides, subject to eight exceptions,19 that "when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of
this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties."20
Yet for those who seek guidance from the Code on what
constitutes a "reasonable relation," it provides little in the way of an
answer. Beyond maintaining that "the law chosen must be that of a
jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making or
performance of the contract is to occur or occurs," 21 the drafters left
17. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (2002) (setting forth the territorial application of the Act and the
parties' power to choose applicable law). The drafters also included in this section a rule that
would govern in circumstances where the parties had not or could not agree on applicable law. §
1-105(1). In such cases, the law of the forum state is to be applied to "transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to" the forum state. § 1-105(1). This provision, however, was not greeted
with open arms. Critics voiced two major objections: (1) making the law of the forum state
applicable to transactions with only the slightest factual connection to that state violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) even if the general choice-of-law rule
was constitutional, its selection would result in a blatant type of forum-shopping. A number of
law professors who taught conflict of laws went so far as to pass a resolution stating that section
1-105 was "unwise and should be omitted from the Code." See Max Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws
in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 115 (1951) (reproducing the
resolution). The New York Law Revision Commission also recommended the deletion of section
1-105. See LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION
FOR 1956, at 34-35 (1956). Despite the inhospitable reception, however, the drafters stuck to their
guns, and the choice-of-law section remains a part of the Code.
18. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2002) (stating that "[tihe effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement"). The official comment to this section also emphasizes that "freedom of
contract is a principle of the Code." § 1-102 cmt. 2.
19. § 1-105(2) (enumerating the eight exceptions). They cover transactions involving rights
of creditors against sold goods, leases, bank deposits and collections, funds transfers, letters of
credit, bulk sales, investment securities, and secured transactions. § 1-105(2). To the extent that
the foregoing transactions are governed by rules located in other articles of the Code, those rules
supersede any law selected by the parties. In most cases, this limit on party autonomy is
necessary to protect the rights of third parties.
20. § 1-105(1). Party autonomy initially was only recognized in contracts involving foreign
trade. It was not until the 1952 draft that parties were given the ability to stipulate the
applicable law in a purely domestic transaction. The development of section 1-105 is traced in
WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-105:2 (1982), and Robert A.
Leflar, Conflict of Laws Under the U.C.C., 35 ARK. L. REV. 87 (1981).
21. § 1-105 cmt. 1. The drafters also indicate in this comment that "[in general, the test of
'reasonable relation' is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court" in Seeman v. Phila.
Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). § 1-105 cmt. 1. The Seeman case, however, did not involve a
choice-of-law clause; the only question before the Court having been whether Pennsylvania's
usury statute governed a transaction between a New York borrower and a Pennsylvania lender.
Seeman, 274 U.S. at 404. Nevertheless, the following language from the Court's opinion is
instructive:
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the matter to judicial decision. The only certain proposition is that the
parties' choice will not be upheld unless there is some geographic
nexus between the state or country whose law is selected and the
events leading to the contract's making or the acts involved in its
performance. 22
Emboldened by the legislative success of the Code,23 the
American Law Institute (the "A.L.I.") similarly incorporated freedom
of contract in choice-of-law matters into the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws ("the Restatement"), 24  emphasizing that "the
demands of certainty, predictability and convenience dictate that...
the parties should have power to choose the applicable law."25  The
"private legislation" objection to party autonomy was no longer
theoretically persuasive. It should be plain that the driving idea here
is that the parties alone are not making a legislative choice for the
courts but, rather, that the privilege of party autonomy is ultimately
being recognized by the applicable choice-of-law rule of the forum. 26
Notwithstanding the skepticism Learned Hand had counseled,27 the
shift by the drafters of the U.C.C. and the Restatement toward
acceptance marked the emergence of a more sophisticated and
deferential legal stance generally toward contractual choice of law.
[T]he parties must act in good faith.... The effect of the qualification is merely to
prevent the evasion or avoidance at will of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the
parties' entering into the contract or stipulating for its performance at a place which
has no normal relation to the transaction and to whose law they would not otherwise
be subject.
Seeman, 274 U.S. at 408.
22. Even if such a nexus exists, however, there is no guarantee that a court will not choose
to strike the clause on some other basis. For example, a court may conclude that the clause or its
method of procurement is unconscionable, especially in a consumer setting. Also, the public
policy of the forum may place a limit on the power of the parties to select their applicable law.
See, e.g., United Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 775 P.2d 233, 235
(N.M. 1989). But see EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.12, at 677 (1992)
(concluding that section 1-105 has no public policy exception).
23. After the Code's initial adoption by Pennsylvania in 1953, nationwide enactment was
temporarily halted when the Code was criticized by the New York Law Revision Commission and
temporarily rejected by that state. See Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code, in
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE HANDBOOK 1, 5-6 (American Bar Ass'n, 1964). It was not until
Massachusetts enacted the 1957 Official Text of the Code that its prospects brightened. See id. at
7-8. Today the Code, in one form or another, is the law in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
25. § 187 cmt. e.
26. § 187 cmt. e; Ribstein, supra note 12, at 261 ("The 'private legislation' argument has
been criticized on the ground that the contract leaves the ultimate decision with the court based
on the parties' choice of law and other factors.").
27. See supra note 15.
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Once released from the constraints of an outdated conception of
party autonomy, the difficult issue for theorists became the
appropriate scope of the parties' power to choose the applicable law. In
this regard, the drafters of the Restatement conceptualized the matter
quite differently than had the drafters of the U.C.C. Where the latter
adopted and proceeded from a unitary view under which the law
chosen by the parties is uniformly applicable to all the terms of the
contract and aspects of the relationship, the A.L.I. identified two
separate categories of contractual provisions. These consist of: (1)
those addressing issues, such as sufficiency of performance and
excuse, that are and always have been within the contractual capacity
of the parties to determine; 28 and (2) those addressing issues, such as
capacity to contract and the statute of frauds, which are governed by
immutable state law and are therefore of such a character that the
parties could not have resolved them by explicit provision in their
agreement. 29 The A.L.I. believed that choice-of-law clauses would fare
better and prove less troublesome if guided by recognition of this
duality, which is not only more faithful to our conflicts history but also
squarely confronts the interests at stake when a single contract has a
connection to two or more states. 30 The drafters of the Restatement
therefore thought it critical to reject what they considered to be the
harmful illusion that all contractual issues are similar.
As to the first category of issues, those traditionally resolved by
contractual terms, the Restatement provides that the state law chosen
by the parties will always be applied. 31 In such a situation, no
countervailing policy is implicated, because the parties could have
accomplished the same thing by drafting a clause mimicking the
attributes of the chosen law. 32 By contrast, when the issue concerns a
28. § 187 cmt. c. The Restatement also cites "rules relating to construction [and] to
conditions precedent and subsequent" as examples. § 187 cmt. c.
29. § 187 cmt. d. Also included would be questions involving other "formalities and
substantial validity." § 187 cmt. d.
30. Courts and commentators have always felt more comfortable with the proposition that
parties should be free to choose the law that governs the interpretation of their contract, but
should not be free to select the law that will govern the validity of their contract. See Ernest G.
Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565, 655 (1921);
Robert Szold, Comments on Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws-
Contracts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1524, 1525 (1963).
31. § 187(1).
32. This is not to suggest that incorporation of a term by reference to the law of another
jurisdiction will always have the same practical effect as an explicit statement in a contract of
the desired term. For one thing, determining what the parties intended by the language of their
agreement is often a question of "fact" for the jury with its concomitant limited scope of appellate
review. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2) (1986) (explaining that a
question of interpretation of an agreement is one of fact if it "depends on the credibility of
extrinsic evidence or a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence").
[Vol. 56:57
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matter not amenable to regulation by contract, the Restatement
significantly curtails the parties' autonomy.33  In such cases, the
parties' choice will not be effective if:
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which ... would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 4
Underlying this less generous grant of party autonomy is the
drafters' reluctance to diminish the benefits that certain state policies
were meant to ensure, 35 as well as their desire to make certain that
the parties had a legitimate reason for their choice of law. 36 In effect,
by rejecting the conceptual framework of the Code, the drafters of the
Restatement have created a test that is both broader and narrower
than the Code formulation. As one commentator has noted:
It [is] broader in two ways. First, the parties' choice of law [is] in no way limited if the
issue [is] one that the parties could have resolved in their contract. Second, although
there [is] a requirement that the choice be reasonable, there [is] no requirement that the
relationship between the transaction and the chosen law be reasonable .... The
Restatement test [is] narrower, however, in that it provide[s] for a limitation on even a
reasonable choice of law if there [is] a conflict with a fundamental policy of a state with
a materially greater interest in the issue.
37
B. The Debate Revisited
Several decades have passed since the Code and the
Restatement shifted toward a more favorable view of party
In contrast, determining the law of another jurisdiction is a job that properly belongs to the court
and is reviewable on appeal on a plenary basis. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the substance of a written clause will not change over time unless amended by
agreement of the parties. Query: What happens if the law of the chosen jurisdiction changes after
the parties execute their agreement? Should the court apply the law as it existed when the
parties made their choice or as it exists at the time of decision?
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). Ironically, when the
validity of the parties' contract is on the line (an issue outside their ability to predetermine),
choice of law "matters most." See Ribstein, supra note 12, at 262.
34. § 187(2).
35. See § 187 cmt. g ("Fulfillment of the parties' expectations is not the only value in
contract law; regard must also be had for state interests and for state regulation.").
36. § 187 cmt. f. For example, "[t]he forum will not ... apply a foreign law which has been
chosen by the parties in the spirit of adventure or to provide mental exercise for the judge." § 187
cmt. f.
37. Amelia Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing
Applicable Law and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INT'L
LAw. 1067, 1074-75 (1998).
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autonomy,38 and the future of choice-of-law clauses has once again
become the center of a major policy debate. This change has occurred
in part because codification has increasingly become the preferred
method of shaping the development of commercial law.39 Aside from
the process of periodic adjustments in existing U.C.C. articles to
reflect fundamental changes in society,40  on several occasions
supplementary articles have been enacted as formal amendments to
the Code. 4' In addition to these efforts to keep the Code responsive to
contemporary needs, legislatures have also enacted auxiliary statutes
covering limited subjects that are not consolidated into the Code. 42
These drafting projects have stimulated the debate over contractual
choice by creating an opportunity for those who have been critical of
restraints on party autonomy to voice their displeasure and lobby for
change, and for others who see party autonomy as a problem rather
than a solution to advocate for greater statutory protections for those
upon whom choice-of-law clauses are likely to be imposed (i.e.,
consumers and small businesses). At no time has the debate been
more heated than it was during the drafting of U.C.I.T.A.
From the very beginning, the drafts of U.C.I.T.A. (and its
forerunner, proposed U.C.C. Article 2B) contained a powerful
endorsement of party autonomy that exceeded the contents of section
38. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
39. To be sure, codification is not an altogether new phenomenon. The Code supplanted
uniform acts that were drafted and approved by N.C.C.U.S.L. over the course of half a century,
including the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. See U.C.C. general cmt., at 21 (2002).
40. Within the past decade, N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I. have revised Articles 1 (2001), 3
(1990), 4A (1989), 5 (1995), 6 (1989), 8 (1994), and 9 (2001). See U.C.C. preface, at III. Drafting
committees are currently revising or amending Articles 2, 2A, 7, and, once again, Articles 3 and
4. Although the particular impetus for each revision project has been somewhat different, the
basic objective has always been to prevent the Code from becoming outdated. For example, since
the promulgation of the 1957 Official Text of the Code, Article 2 (Sales) has remained virtually
unchanged. The same cannot be said, however, of commercial and consumer law generally and
the technological environment in which many transactions now take place. Some of the more
obvious changes include the common-law development of a theory of strict products liability that
overlaps the Code, the enactment of a "hodgepodge of [federal and state] consumer product
legislation," and the growing use of electronic methods of contracting. Edith Resnick Warkentine,
Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and "Merchant/Consumers" Through
Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 78 (1996). Thus, when one also considers the vast
number of judicial opinions that have revealed weaknesses in the current statutory structure, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that Article 2 may be in need of revision.
41. See, e.g., U.C.C. arts. 2A, 4A.
42. For example, recognizing that inappropriate law could hinder the development of
electronic commerce and that the impact of new technologies extends beyond the scope of the
Code to other types of transactions, N.C.C.U.S.L. completed the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act in 1999. Another recent effort to statutorily preempt burgeoning case law is U.C.I.T.A. See
supra note 7.
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1-105 of the Code and the Restatement. 43  Perhaps the most
fundamental point is that the new framework created by the drafters
of the U.C.C. and the Restatement called into question the need for
any restrictions at all on the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses in
commercial transactions. 44 The U.C.I.T.A. drafting committee saw
complete party autonomy as a necessary guarantor of the successful
development of electronic commerce. Because the Internet recognizes
no geographic borders, the committee concluded that the approach
embodied in section 1-105 and the Restatement had to be rejected if
electronic commerce was to flourish. 45 In other words, the drafters of
U.C.I.T.A. sought to leave nothing to judicial decision on the theory
that, unless the parties selecting a jurisdiction to provide the
governing law could be certain that their choice would be given effect,
the unfortunate result would be that "even the smallest business
would be subject to the law of all fifty States and all countries in the
world."46
It was inevitable that this hyperbolic claim would ultimately
draw into question the drafters' notion that U.C.I.T.A. transactions
were somehow different from ordinary commercial transactions and
that the environment of cyberspace required special rules to govern
the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses.47 Indeed, many argued that
U.C.I.T.A. was so flawed in its structure and in many of its individual
43. See Boss, supra note 37, at 1091 ("From the very outset, the drafts of Article 2B have
contained broad choice-of-law (and choice of forum) provisions.").
44. The discussion in the text ignores the special rules included in Article 2B governing
consumer transactions. See Boss, supra note 37, at 1093 ("[lU]nlike prior law (such as current
section 1-105 or the Restatement) where no distinction was drawn between transactions based
on the nature of the parties, Article 2B was introducing a distinction between consumer and
commercial transactions.").
45. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109 cmt. 2(a) (2001).
The information economy accentuates [the importance of contractual choice-of-law
clauses] because communications capabilities allow remote parties easily to enter into
and perform contracts through systems spanning multiple jurisdictions and in
circumstances that do not depend on the physical location of either party or of the
information. Many computer information transactions occur in cyberspace, rather
than in definable, fixed locations.
Id.; see also WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (July 1, 1997)
('The U.S. should work closely with other nations to clarify applicable jurisdictional rules and to
generally favor and enforce contract provisions that allow parties to select substantive rules
governing liability.").
46. § 109 cmt. 2.
47. Not everyone believes that electronic commerce and the Internet are as "different" as
the drafters of U.C.I.T.A. claim. See, e.g., Memorandum from William J. Woodward, Jr., to
Members, American Law Institute Regarding Motion to Delete Section 2B-107(a) from Draft
UCC Article 2B (May 6, 1998), available at http:l/www.ali.org/alilWoodwardl.htm.
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provisions that the entire project should be scrapped. 48 The A.L.I.
itself eventually withdrew from the project in the aftermath of this
controversy. Nevertheless, U.C.I.T.A. was eventually approved by
N.C.C.U.S.L. and sent to the states for adoption as a statute external
to the Code. The provision on choice of law states:
The parties in their agreement may choose the applicable law. However, the choice is
not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be
varied by agreement under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply ... in the
absence of the agreement. 49
Thus, at least in commercial cases governed by U.C.I.T.A., no
relationship between the state law chosen and the geographic location
of the transaction is at all necessary.
Of equal significance to the party autonomy debate are the
recent revisions to U.C.C. Article 1.50 Here, too, significant changes to
traditional choice-of-law doctrine outside the context of conventional
consumer transactions are in the offing.5 1 Deference will be accorded
to the parties' agreement when domestic law is selected, 52 except to
the extent that their choice is contrary to a fundamental policy of the
48. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Sign It and Weep, INDUSTRY STANDARD, 2 (Nov. 20, 1998),
at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,2583,00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002) ("The
current draft represents little more than the narrow commercial interests of the major software
companies. It's an embarrassment to its sponsors, who ought to dump the draft and leave the
topic alone.").
49. U.C.I.T.A. § 109 (1999).
50. In 1996, N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I. appointed a drafting committee to undertake two
tasks. One was to revise Article 1; the other, to harmonize the various other Code drafting
projects to the extent appropriate. The discussion in the text is limited to Revised Article 1.
Revised Article 1 received full N.C.C.U.S.L. and A.L.I. approval in 2001. So far, it has only been
adopted by the Virgin Islands. This Article refers to sections in "former" Article 1 as U.C.C. § 1-
xxx (1998) and to provisions in "new" or "revised" Article 1 as Rev. § 1-xxx (2001). All other
provisions of the Code, not changed by Revised Article 1, shall be cited as U.C.C. § x-xxx (1998).
Revised Article 1, unlike other provisions of limited application, will apply to every Code-covered
transaction unless displaced elsewhere. However, Revised Article 1 is by no means the only
article of the Code in which one can find major changes in choice-of-law philosophy. For example,
revised Article 9 provides for maximum party autonomy in choosing the law that will govern
security interests in bank accounts. See § 9-304. The official comments to section 9-304 make
clear that "[t]he parties' choice is effective, even if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no
relationship to the parties or the transaction." § 9-304 cmt. 2. This choice-of-law provision,
however, only applies to questions of perfection and priorities. It does not permit a bank to opt
into another state's version of Article 9 or to choose the law that will govern attachment of the
security interest. See also §§ 4A-507, 5-116, 8-110.
51. If one of the parties to the transaction is a consumer, a choice-of-law agreement is not
effective to deprive the consumer of the protection of a nonvariable consumer protection rule of
the jurisdiction where either (1) the consumer resides or (2) where both the contract and delivery
were made. See U.C.C. Rev.§ 1-301(e) (2001).
52. § 1-301(a)(2). If the law chosen is that of a country other than the United States, the
drafters curiously require that the transaction bear a reasonable relationship to a foreign
jurisdiction (but not necessarily to the chosen jurisdiction). § 1-301(c)(2).
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jurisdiction whose law would otherwise govern in the absence of a
contractual designation. 53 Under this approach, the key issue ceases to
be the existence of a "reasonable relation" (as in former Article 1) and
becomes whether a conflicting policy is "fundamental" or something
less. This distinction is not always sharp, and it will call for an
exercise of judgment. In the vast majority of cases, however, it should
be easily administered, and the parties' choice given effect. 54
A general conclusion emerges from the discussion and
developments to date: The new choice-of-law framework resulting
from these reform efforts will provide parties with an expanded menu
of legal regimes from which to choose when selecting the law that will
govern their contract. That flexibility will in turn lead to more
frequent use of contractual choice-of-law clauses.55 Indeed, some have
suggested that omitting such a clause may soon be considered
malpractice by the commercial lawyer.56
Given both the trend toward permitting unlimited contractual
choice of law and the growing popularity of these clauses, it is worth
pausing to examine how the judicial system might appropriately
53. § 1-301(f).
54. More precisely, this prediction assumes that courts will heed the admonition in the
official comment:
Under the fundamental policy doctrine, a court should not refrain from applying the
designated law merely because application of that law would lead to a result different
than would be obtained under the local law of the State or country whose law would
otherwise govern. Rather, the difference must be contrary to a public policy of that
jurisdiction that is so substantial that it justifies overriding the concerns for certainty
and predictability underlying modern commercial law as well as concerns for judicial
economy generally.
§ 1-301 cmt. 6.
There is no indication in Revised Section 1-301 whether the forum court is to decide for itself
what constitutes a fundamental policy of the state whose law would otherwise govern or whether
the forum court is bound by the answer the other state has given, or would give if presented with
such an opportunity. It has been suggested that the constitutionality of section 1-103 may
depend on the answer. See Richard K. Greenstein, Is the Proposed U.C.C. Choice of Law
Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2000).
55. U.C.I.T.A. and the changes to Article 1 are only part of a more general trend to expand
party autonomy in the choice-of-law area. Various nonuniform state statutes and international
instruments also provide for expanded freedom to choose the law of the contract in transactions.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2001) (providing that in transactions over
$250,000 New York law can be selected even if New York is an unrelated state); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2002) (stating that in transactions involving $1 million or
more the parties can select the law of any unrelated jurisdiction); European Communities,
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS, THE
E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 348 (P.M. North ed., 1982).
56. See, e.g., Letter from the Co-Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Subcommittee on
Information Contracting of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar
Association Section of Business Law to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (July 8, 1999), available at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/7899bls.html.
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respond. In particular, this Article addresses a problem that has been
overlooked by both courts and commentators: How should a forum
state's appellate court determine issues not directly addressed by the
law of the foreign 57 jurisdiction whose law has been contractually
chosen? As the discussion below will show, in this situation the
appellate courts of the forum state ought to accept reasonable trial
court interpretations of the law of the foreign jurisdiction. This Article
will suggest that, in the face of ambiguity, trial court interpretations
should be allowed to prevail so long as they are reasonable. Here, the
relationship of choice of law to judicial administration should be
neither acquiescence nor hostility, but instead adaptation. Some may
find this idea quite jarring in view of the basic and often-repeated
principle that when issues of law are appealed, appellate courts use a
de novo standard of review by which the trial court's conclusions may
be set aside freely.58 On the other hand, the notion is strikingly
reminiscent of the enthusiasm created by Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins5 9 for affording limited appellate review of state law rulings
in federal court-at least until that enthusiasm was dampened by the
Supreme Court.60 Perhaps this former federal practice has something
to teach us about mediating the relationship between trial and
appellate courts in an entirely different context.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of appellate
review of trial court rulings on issues of foreign law? What exactly
does judicial review of unsettled questions of foreign law accomplish?
What is its price? These questions are of considerable theoretical
interest and immense practical importance. Their resolution calls for
inquiries into the allocation of judicial authority and in its production
of outcomes in the real world.
The discussion proceeds first by briefly describing in Part II
some of the causes and effects of the steadily increasing caseloads in
appellate courts. After demonstrating that these caseloads may soon
become unmanageable, Part II examines the two essential functions of
appellate review and the justification for the conventional standards
of review applied by appellate courts.
Part III turns to the more complex matter of appellate review
of issues of foreign law. It finds that neither of the functions served by
appellate courts can provide a sound foundation for the de novo
57. Here and elsewhere, when I use the term "foreign," the meaning is not limited to
matters concerning the laws of other nations, but also includes matters concerning the law of any
jurisdictional system other than that of which the forum court is a part.
58. See infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
59. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
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standard of review normally applied when issues of law are involved
and urges a rethinking of the standard in light of the modern
developments discussed above.
Part IV accordingly addresses the normative question of
whether de novo review should be abandoned when issues of foreign
law are reviewed. This portion of the Article devotes attention to the
private and institutional costs of de novo review and seeks to identify
the potential harm, if any, to litigants that would result if the
standard were changed. The discussion concludes that a deferential
standard of review would offer litigants a fair means of dispute
resolution and potentially mitigate the crisis of volume that has
afflicted the appellate system.
Finally, Part V discusses and critiques two alternative
procedures for dealing with foreign law issues. The analysis shows
that a deferential standard of review is a more theoretically satisfying
way to protect the interests of litigants and to cope with rising
dockets.
II. THE WORK-AND WORKLOAD-OF APPELLATE COURTS
Although the right to appeal to a higher judicial authority is of
ancient lineage6 and widely accepted, 62 it still engenders a multitude
of problems related to the dramatic increase in the workload of
appellate courts. The issues associated with this development are both
complex and important; they merit comprehensive development and
exposition beyond the breadth of a single article. 63 However, this
61. A form of appellate review can be found as far back as 4000 B.C.E. in ancient Egypt. See
1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 11-13, 28-34 (1928). For
a general description of the development of the concept of appellate review from its inception in
the early civilizations that bordered the Mediterranean Sea to more recent developments in the
United States, see ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE 2-15 (1983).
62. Notwithstanding the generally held belief that "[t]he opportunity to take one's case to 'a
higher court' as a matter of right is one of the foundation stones of both our state and federal
court systems," FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 16 (1980), such review is not required
as a matter of due process. See, e.g., Nat'l Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S.
37, 43 (1954).
63. Consider the following statistics:
In the federal courts, appellate filings increased 300% (four-fold) from 1961 to 1974. In
California, there was an increase from 3,872 in 1964 to 9,186 in 1973. In Illinois, there
was an increase in appellate filings from 1,338 in 1965 to 3,020 in 1972. In Michigan,
there was an increase from 1,475 in 1966 to 3,076 in 1973. In New Jersey, there was
an increase from 1,230 in 1964 to 3,870 in 1973. In New York, there was an increase
from 3,967 in 1965 to 5,675 in 1973. Similar increases have been experienced in
almost every populous state for which figures are available.
PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 4-5 (1976) (citations omitted). Since these
figures were gathered, conditions have steadily worsened. See, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen, Creating
an Appetite for Appellate Reform in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598 (1994) ("During 1992,
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Article focuses upon one method of dealing with the problem of an
ever-expanding appellate caseload that would decrease the number of
cases commenced by inducing litigants to appeal less frequently. 64
A. Appellate Court Bloat
About seventy years ago, Dean Leon Green addressed the
staggering growth in the volume of appellate cases, distilling the
essence of its underlying causes:
Probably the strangest chapter in American legal history is how in the short period of
the last fifty years or seventy-five years, the same period during which trial courts were
losing most of their power, the appellate courts have drawn unto themselves practically
all the power of the judicial system. 65
One-half century later, Judge Joseph R. Weisberger stated the
effects of this judicial power grab most dramatically:
The appellate structure of our judicial system resembles a great full-rigged ship, some of
whose seams have been opened below the waterline by the incessant pounding of the
seas. The crew has vigorously manned the pumps in order to prevent the vessel from
foundering. However, try as they may, with might and main, the crews of appellate
judges are able to do no more than maintain a precarious balance between sinking and
sailing.66
This point needs to be constantly reiterated to those who cling
to the antiquated notion that appellate courts are necessary to achieve
the ends of justice; that they represent an order of courts superior to
the trial courts. Perhaps this claim to judicial superiority held true
there were approximately twenty-three civil appeals for every 100 contested civil cases tried in
superior courts, compared with an average of twenty during the preceding four years-a jump of
fifteen percent.").
64. The basic thrust of the proposals for dealing with appellate bloat has been to increase
the number of judges or quasi-judicial officers who participate in the disposition of cases and to
reduce the amount of time devoted to a case. For a valuable collection of the articles, books, and
reports that have been devoted to the reform effort, see THOMAS MARVELL & CARLISLE MOODY,
STATE APPELLATE COURT ADAPTATION TO CASELOAD AND DELAY PROBLEMS (1988).
65. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930). A discussion of four devices by which
appellate courts have managed to control the ultimate outcome of litigation and diminish the
importance of trial courts may be found in Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of
Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957). According to Professor Wright, these devices are:
[R]eview by the appellate court of the size of verdicts; orders for a new trial where the
verdict is thought to be contrary to the clear weight of the evidence; refusal to be
bound by findings of fact of the trial judge based on documentary evidence; and
expanded use of the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition to control the
trial court in its discretionary actions as to the procedure by which a case is to be
handled.
Id. at 751-52. For a discussion of several other reasons for appellate court congestion, see
CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 5-7.
66. Joseph R. Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U. L. REV.
237, 237 (1982).
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years ago, before the number of appellate cases soared, but it is
certainly not true today. At one time appellate judges were able to
devote sufficient time and energy to the decisionmaking process.6 7
They would carefully read the briefs and the trial transcript in
preparation for oral argument and hold conferences to consider
precedents and other authorities. 68 The writing of the opinion was
never hurried, but would go through several drafts. 69 The hallmark of
the entire process was collegiality: ideas were constantly being shared
by the judges with one another and with their clerks.70 It should come
as no surprise, therefore, that appellate court decisions were viewed
as more likely to be just than the "heat of battle" decisions made by
trial judges lacking the opportunity for leisurely reflection.71
If the foregoing description paints an inaccurate picture of
appellate practice, what might be a more accurate depiction? It is
apparent from the way judges themselves have described the
consequences of increasing caseloads that the collegial atmosphere of
an earlier day has been replaced by an "assembly line" model of
justice.7 2 Associate Justice Winslow Christian of the Court of Appeal
for San Francisco, California, has written:
Judgeships have been added to the point that the larger appellate courts cannot
function as collegial bodies, and doctrinal consistency is hard to maintain; courts have
created central staffs of research attorneys, increased the number of law clerks, and
moved in the direction of long-tenure research attorneys in place of the traditional new-
graduate law clerk, and much of the writing issued in the court's name is not done by
judges at all. A general speed-up creates pressure to eliminate or curtail oral argument,
67. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the
Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 938 (1980).
68. See id.
69. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
vii-viii (1928); John Bilyeu Oakley & Robert S. Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition
and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1286 (1979).
Appellate Judge Winslow Christian has put it this way:
A law teacher, a legislator, or even a newly appointed appellate judge may hold quaint
ideas about what goes on inside an appellate court: The judges are supposed to give
thoughtful attention to full-scale oral argument; they supposedly consider the cases
thoroughly in conference; and then a judge (assisted by an admiring young clerk in
the role of apprentice) studies the record, collects the authorities, and goes through
several drafts before presenting his colleagues with an opinion embodying the
collegial conclusion of the judges. It is a charming and reassuring picture. But that
picture is contrary to fact in every appellate court that I know about.
Winslow Christian, Appellate Bloat Threatens Our Courts, 19 JUDGES' J. 27, 27 (1980).
70. See Christian, supra note 69, at 27; see also Oakley, supra note 69, at 1287.
71. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., WARREN BURGER, YEAR END REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY 2 (1981) (observing
that courts are moving "towards an assembly line model" to deal with the large number of
appellate cases); CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 ("Changes which are characteristic of
any shift from individually crafted works to mass production methods can be seen to be occurring
in appellate processes and institutions.").
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to shorten or slight the judicial conference and to make it hard for the judges to find
time for reading, reflection, and careful writing demanded by difficult cases. A present-
day appellate judge works in an atmosphere not of scholarly deliberation but of anxious
response to pressure to produce an ever increasing volume of dispositions.7 3
How are the growth of appellate cases and the new process of
judging to be appraised? Does such growth, and the process it
dictates, preserve the essential functions of appellate adjudication?
Resolution of these questions is critical. The legal profession should be
willing to weigh dispassionately the appellate system on the scales of
justice, measuring the values it is intended to currently promote
against the countervailing need for an efficient judicial system. If the
privilege of appeal is necessary or strongly desirable in our system of
justice, its importance would seem to preclude sacrificing its values to
concerns about efficiency. On the other hand, if the privilege of appeal
has, at least in certain cases, little functional importance, the failure
to recognize this fact and differentiate among types of cases can
perpetuate appellate bloat and undermine the legitimate rationale for
an appellate system. It seems appropriate, therefore, to analyze the
consequences of an expanding caseload against the core functions of
appellate review.
B. The Essential Functions of Appellate Review
Discussions of the essential functions of appellate review have
been dominated by the distinction between error correction and law
development, a distinction that has been the keystone upon which our
whole system of appellate courts has been built v4 In jurisdictions
73. Christian, supra note 69, at 27. Others have made similar observations. See, e.g., Robert
S. Thompson & John B. Oakley, From Information to Opinion in Appellate Courts: How Funny
Things Happen on the Way Through the Forum, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1986):
Only the naive can believe that an appellate judge ostensibly required to give
painstaking consideration to briefs of counsel, trial court records, relevant precedent,
and on occasion, philosophical and scientific discourse, and then to construct an
opinion synthesizing these items for testing by vigorous dialectic with colleagues, has
truly done so while producing opinions at the rate of over one per day.
This output level stands in stark contrast to the number of opinions produced by
the Second Circuit during Learned Hand's tenure. Then, each three-judge panel was
responsible for an average rate of 125 opinions per year, not all of which were lengthy
or involved difficult issues.
MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 68, 312-13 (1970).
74. Although one might construct an argument that additional functions are served by
appellate review, see, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court:
Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974), further reflection strongly suggests
that these are little more than variations on the traditional dual-purpose themes. See, e.g.,
CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 2 ("In the received tradition, the function of appellate
adjudication are two-fold."); MARTINEAU, supra note 61, at 19 ("Although some commentators
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where there is an intermediate appellate court, it is assumed that its
primary responsibility will be to correct errors in the trial court, while
the supreme court can concentrate on developing a useful body of
law. 75 Of course, in jurisdictions where there is no intermediate
appellate court, the supreme court will necessarily have to perform
both functions. Moreover, where intermediate courts exist but review
by the supreme court is discretionary, the intermediate courts
necessarily play a key role in developing the law.76
With respect to error correction, appellate courts see to it that
inferior tribunals obey the law, thereby promoting the perception of
legitimacy by ensuring that the ultimate outcome of litigation is based
on impersonal and reasoned judgments. 77 Further, the expectation by
lower court judges that many, though not all, of their decisions will be
reviewed, can help to prevent error by encouraging those judges to
exercise greater caution in performing their duties. 78
As for the law development function, sometimes called
"institutional" review, 79 appellate review actually serves two main
objectives. First, appellate review provides the means by which the
common law can evolve to reflect the changing needs of society.80
identify other functions, these other purposes are usually aspects of either error correction or law
development.").
75. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 4 ('Many states now have intermediate court
structures comparable to that of the federal system, and most have established, at least in some
degree, a difference of function for the two levels of appellate courts, based on this duality.");
Richard Henry Mills, Caseload Explosion: The Appellate Response, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1982) (noting that the intermediate appellate court "is assigned the function of correcting
mistakes," while the supreme court has "the obligation of law development") (internal citations
omitted). Indeed, the federal court of appeals, added by the Evarts Act of 1891, was envisioned as
an error-correcting court. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural
Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21 (1996).
76. See Dragich, supra note 75, at 22-23.
77. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 2 ("[Tjhe review for correctness serves to
reinforce the dignity, authority and acceptability of the trial, and to control the adverse effects of
any personal shortcomings of the basic decision-makers.").
78. Appellate review can also serve as an "error prevention" system in that the possibility of
an appeal may prevent a judge from consciously acting in a manner that would constitute
reversible error. The possibility of review may even cause a judge to exercise greater caution to
prevent unintentional error. MARTINEAU, supra note 61, at 20.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(observing that "judges do and must legislate"); Jabez Fox, Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545,
548 (1899) (recognizing that "judicial legislation... is inherent in the strict performance of
judicial duty"); Kurland, supra note 74, at 618 (observing that the ability of courts to make law
"is the genius of the common law system that we inherited from our English forebears"). Justice
Cardozo's cognizance of the lawmaking role of courts is evident in the following excerpt from his
essays on the craft of judging:
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench to find how trackless
was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and
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Second, appellate review helps avoid the unpredictability of legal rules
that might otherwise result from the contradictory decisions of
independent courts. Only with a hierarchy of courts providing a
uniform judicial interpretation of federal and state law is it possible to
secure the values associated with judicial consistency.81
C. Standards of Appellate Review
In any appraisal of the impact of today's caseload on appellate
decisionmaking, the standards of review used by appellate courts, and
their underpinnings, are pertinent to the discussion. The applicable
standard determines whether the relationship among the courts in
any judicial system is maintained or altered. Care must be exercised
to differentiate between cases in which an appellate court reviews on a
plenary basis (de novo review) and cases in which an appellate court
employs a "clearly erroneous" or deferential standard of review. In the
former, the court decides for itself how the issues presented ought to
be resolved, while in the latter the reviewing court can inquire into
the rational basis of challenged lower court findings, upholding them
if they are found to be reasonable.
A caveat should perhaps be interposed here. Although the
reviewing court in a de novo review is not required to give the
reasoned conclusions of the lower court any particular weight, one has
to assume that in the majority of cases these conclusions are at least
given the weight of a well-written law review article and may prove to
be quite helpful, if not persuasive. Moreover, an appellate court
employing the "clearly erroneous" standard will not reverse merely
because the lower court's finding is not one the appellate court would
have made had it been the initial adjudicator; rather, the finding will
be overturned only where the appellate court finds it to be
unreasonable. Thus, in both cases, but especially in clearly erroneous
reviews, the trial court's opinion carries significant weight.8 2
disheartened when I found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land,
the solid land of fixed and settled rules .... As the years have gone by ... I have
become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I
have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery but creation.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Adherence to Precedent: The Subconscious Element in the Judicial
Process, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142, 166 (1931). Recent events have taught us
that, at least in one context, a change in law by a state court is prohibited by federal statutory
and constitutional law. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
81. For a discussion of what those values are, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
82. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed." United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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This discussion leads us to the question of how a court decides
which standard of review is appropriate in a particular case.
Traditionally, questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of
fact are reviewable only on a clearly erroneous basis.8 3 Although
questions of law and fact are not always easily distinguishable, and
while there may be shades of gray between the black and white, the
traditional division is nevertheless important.8 4 For one thing, the
courts employ these terms.8 5 More importantly, though, there is
historical justification for the theory of review grounded upon the law-
fact distinction. It rests upon the belief that different tiers of courts
possess different decisionmaking skills and that this distinction
recognizes the particular competence of each.
We have seen that at one time appellate courts were not
"processing institutions,"'8 6 but rather were collegial institutions with
sufficient time and manpower to provide the study and reflection that
complex legal issues deserve.87 By contrast, trial courts have always
been what modern appellate courts have now become: high-volume,
fast-paced purveyors of justice. Given this and other historical
differences between trial and appellate courts, it is not surprising that
there has been widespread and persistent belief that appellate judges
83. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2585, at 729, § 2588, at 749-50 (1977); see also Irving Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are
They Useful in the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEO. L.J. 417, 430 (1968) ("[T]he conventional
fact-law distinction.., is the purported foundation of appellate review, the archpremise which
has woven review into the fabric of the administration of justice since the fifteenth century.").
84. The difficulty involved in applying the distinction between "law" and "fact" in particular
cases can be seen in connection with so-called mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., United
States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that, in most cases, a mixed
question of law and fact should be reviewed de novo). Appellate courts have also departed from
the usual law-fact distinction in cases involving so-called constitutional facts. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985); see also Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (noting that the law-fact distinction "is often not an
illuminating test and is never self-executing"); Wilner, supra note 83, at 431 ("It requires a good
deal of pretending to suppose that the theory of appellate review, presupposing a relatively tight
segregation of fact from law, is as valid today as it was a century ago .... ). Just recently, the
Supreme Court held that "the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' tried by the jury"
and appellate courts should, therefore, reconsider the award in a de novo review. Cooper Indus.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001).
85. See, e.g., Tupman v. Haberkern, 280 P. 970, 973 (Cal. 1929) (stating that questions of
fact are decided by the trial court and that questions of law are decided by the appellate court).
The law-fact distinction has also found its way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For
example, Rule 52(a) provides that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Implicit
in Rule 52(a) is the principle that legal questions should receive independent review. See
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
86. Robert H. Bork, Dealing with Overloads in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 233 (1976).
87. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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are more likely to generate the correct answers to questions of law
than are their brethren below who oversee the trial and provide the
initial answers to all legal questions, both simple and difficult.
8 8
Another reason exists for allowing appellate courts to retain the
ultimate responsibility for deciding questions of law. Under the
doctrine of precedent,8 9 appellate rulings of law are the principle
means of assuring some semblance of legal certainty and uniformity,
without which the legal system would descend into chaos.90 It is
commonly understood not only that adherence to precedent increases
efficiency 9' and predictability, 92 but that justice itself requires that
88. The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
District judges preside alone over fast-paced trials: of necessity they devote much of
their energy and resources to hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence. Similarly,
the logistical burdens of trial advocacy limit the extent to which trial counsel is able to
supplement the district judge's legal research without benefit of "extended reflection
[or] extensive information."
Courts of appeals, on the other hand, are structurally suited to the collaborative
judicial process that promotes decisional accuracy. With the record having been
constructed below and settled for purposes of the appeal, appellate judges are able to
devote their primary attention to legal issues. As questions of law become the focus of
appellate review, it can be expected that the parties' briefs will be refined to bring to
bear on the legal issues more information and more comprehensive analysis than was
provided for the district judge.
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991) (citation omitted).
89. Precedent is best known as stare decisis et non quieta movere, meaning "let the decision
stand and do not disturb things which have been settled," John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a
Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1983) (quoting Justice Arthur Goldberg), or "stand
by the precedents and do not disturb the calm." Id. (quoting Justice Stanley Reed).
90. See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 147 (stating that uniformity is "one of
the imperatives of appellate justice"); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 911
(1984) ("Although the uniformity-assuring function of the Court does not strike me as a
constitutionally mandated one, as a matter of policy, our system-any system-would be poorer
and less coherent in the absence of a single, ultimately authoritative court at the apex of the
judicial hierarchy.").
91. The use of precedent dispenses with the need for a judge to reinvent the law in each and
every case. Justice Cardozo made this point when he stated that "the labor of judges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and
one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
who had gone before him." BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149
(1921).
92. Predictability is the most common justification for precedent. See David Lyons, Formal
Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) ('The reason most often given
for the practice of precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial decisions."); Earl
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368 (1988) ("The most commonly heard
justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the need for certainty in the law."). Without
predictability, individuals would be unable to plan their affairs-business or otherwise-with
any degree of legal certainty. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, N.Y.
ST. B.J., July 1990, at 15, 18 (noting that predictability of outcome "is especially important in
cases involving property rights and commercial transactions").
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like cases be treated alike. 93 Thus, limited appellate resources should
be concentrated on that which matters most to the system as a
whole-the promotion of uniformity and the development of a coherent
body of laws. 94 These considerations do not apply to the judicial
review of the factual issues arising from trial court determinations.
Such decisions have no precedential value and only affect those
parties that are currently before the court. Thus, the advantages of
expertise are with the trial judge who is closest to the "action" and,
consequently, is in a much better position to evaluate and weigh the
evidence. 95
III. THE LIMITS OF DE Novo REVIEW IN A FOREIGN LAW SETTING
Thus far the discussion of appellate practice has proceeded as if
the nature of the particular question of law before the court did not
matter-that is, as if the de novo standard of review were always
justified whenever the trial court's decision rests on a particular
conception of the applicable law. But even if it is agreed that the
institutional and structural advantages of appellate courts generally
justify de novo review of legal questions, the considerations marshaled
thus far may not necessarily be decisive in every case. In some cases
countervailing considerations justify and may even demand a rejection
of de novo review. The clearest cases are those in which courts apply
the substantive law of a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, it is in this ever-
expanding context that a significant rethinking of the allocation of
authority among courts is most urgently demanded.
93. The justice argument can be summarized as follows: "[L]ike cases must be treated alike
or else someone is being treated unfairly; therefore, decision makers must treat the parties in the
instant case the same as parties in earlier cases were treated." Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of
Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 89, 90 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
94. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[V]aluable
appellate resources are conserved for those issues that appellate courts are best situated to
decide.").
95. See STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11, at 23 (1977) (recognizing that
the "trial judge, unlike the appellate court, is regularly engaged in resolving issues of fact and is
primarily responsible for doing so"); see also David P. Leonard, The Correctness Function of
Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in an Era of Fragmentation, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
299, 301 (1984) (stating that "[tirial courts are at the front lines of fact-finding... [and]
therefore, do not exist for the purpose of making law"); McConney, 728 F.2d at 1201 (noting that
the application of FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard "emphasizes ... the trial
court's opportunity to judge the accuracy of witnesses' recollections and make credibility
determinations"). When Rule 52(a) was revised in 1985, the rules advisory committee justified
the rule as follows: "''o permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding
function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants,
multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly
reallocate judicial authority." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee's note.
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A. The Error-Correcting Function of Appellate Courts Revisited
We might begin by generalizing the discussion of the error-
correcting function of appellate courts by supposing that the question
at issue is whether legal error can ever be identified or, for that
matter, ever defined. 96 Some commentators have suggested that it
cannot.97 The question can be made more vivid by examining some
characteristic sources of difficulty in the process of statutory
interpretation. To begin with, even the most skillfully drafted statute
can not anticipate every contingency. Moreover, the best drafters
realize that even if one could, there would be perils associated with
writing in too particular terms. 98 For example, it is clear that the
drafters of the U.C.C. understood that codification sometimes fails
because of the excessive rigidity of statutory commands. To address
this phenomenon, and in light of the wide variety of contexts in which
the Code was to be applied, the drafters aimed to craft the Code to
provide a desirable degree of flexibility in implementation. 99  In
96. See, e.g., Robert S. Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A
Comment on Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 423, 424 (1986)
(commenting that Professor Brilmayer's article provides the significant insight that "[j]udicial
opinions and legal literature have failed to recognize the multiple meanings attached to the term
'legal error' and hence have failed to develop a comprehensive definition").
97. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 118-23 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197-203 (1990); Wilner, supra note 83, at 418 ("[T]here is not
objective criterion, either theoretical or practical, whereby it may be demonstrated that the
pronouncement of the reviewing court is necessarily the 'correct' legal evaluation of the
transaction or occurrence upon which it passes judgment."). Even the current Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court has his doubts. See W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, How IT
WAS, HOW IT IS 291 (1987) ("There is simply no demonstrably 'right' answer to the question
involved in many of our difficult cases.").
98. Apart from the inevitable indeterminancy of statutory formulations, see Anthony
D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of "Plain Meaning," 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 529 (1991),
inherent in any piece of legislation is what Professor Hart has called an "indeterminacy of aim."
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961). To make this point, Hart posits an ordinance
barring vehicles from a public park. Id. at 126. Although it may be clear that, if the purpose of
the law is to maintain peace and quiet, then the legislature intended to banish cars, buses, and
motorcycles; it is, however, unclear what other "vehicles" it intended to exclude:
We have initially settled the question that peace and quiet in the park is to be
maintained at the cost, at any rate, of the exclusion of these things. On the other
hand, until we have put the general aim of peace in the park into conjunction with
those cases which we did not, or perhaps could not, initially envisage (perhaps a toy
motor-car electrically propelled) our aim is, in this direction indeterminate. We have
not settled, because we have not anticipated, the question which will be raised by the
unenvisaged case when it occurs: whether some degree of peace in the park is to be
sacrificed to, or defended against, those children whose pleasure or interest is to use
these things.
Id.
99. This point is made by Grant Gilmore with considerable force:
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addition, interpretation is sometimes made difficult by new
technological developments and evolving business practices, 100
creating genuine problems for those who must apply the Code.101
Finally, the interpretative task can be confounded by the legislature's
use of undefined terms.
Consider the "basis of the bargain" requirement for an express
warranty under U.C.C. section 2-313. Under the Uniform Sales Act,
which was the precursor to Article 2 of the U.C.C., actual reliance by
the buyer on a statement or other representation concerning the goods
was a necessary element in a warranty case. 10 2 By contrast, U.C.C.
section 2-313 omits any reference to reliance, instead requiring in each
instance that the representation be a "part of the basis of the bargain
between buyer and seller."10 3  Was this substitution intended as a
means of avoiding the requirement that the buyer show reliance in
[I]t is a matter of vital importance that the Code as a whole be kept in terms of such
generality as to allow an easy and unstrained application of its provisions to new
patterns of business behavior. Commercial codification cannot successfully
overparticularize: the penalty for being too precise is that the statute will have to
keep coming in for repairs (and amendment is a costly, cumbersome, and
unsatisfactory process) or else become a dead-letter.
Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1355 (1948).
From its inception, the Code was perceived by its drafters to be "a semi-permanent piece of
legislation." U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (2002). In particular, we are told that the drafters intended
"to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of
unforeseen and new circumstances and practices." § 1-102 cmt. 1.
100. For a catalogue of the commercial innovations that have arisen since the adoption of the
Code, see John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial Code, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579 (1993).
101. For example, in the course of assessing the ability of existing paper-based legal
requirements to accommodate technological change, a number of difficult issues arise. One is
whether the electronic message can be brought within the definitions of "written" or "writing,"
see § 1-201(46), and "signed," see § 1-201(39), in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds of section
2-201. There seems too little consensus on the proper disposition. For a collection of views, see
Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The Application of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute
of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 13 J.L. & CoM. 143 (1993). This uncertainty has led the
Article 2 Drafting Committee to revise the statute to make it medium neutral. Instead of a
signed writing, the statute may be satisfied by an authenticated record. See U.C.C. § 2-201
(Interim Draft April 2001).
102. An affirmation of fact or promise created an express warranty under the Uniform Sales
Act only "if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." Uniform Sales Act §
12 (1906).
103. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (2002). Under section 2-313(1), express warranties can be created in
several ways: (1) by an affirmation of fact or promise; (2) by a description of the goods; and (3) by
a sample or model of the goods. Regardless of how the warranty is said to arise, no obligation is
imposed on the seller unless the statement, description, or sample or model is "part of the basis
of the bargain." § 2-313(1).
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every breach of express warranty case? 10 4 If a buyer need not rely on
the seller's representation (made by promise, affirmation, description,
model, or sample) to recover, then section 2-313 has indeed worked a
revolution in the law. The nature of related case law can best be
ascertained, however, by considering the following statement:
It would be less than accurate to characterize the case law as manifesting a split of
authority between those cases which insist upon a showing of reliance and those which
reject that requirement. The confusion is much deeper .... [S]ome courts initially state
that reliance is required, only to later suggest that in fact it is not or may not be
required. Other courts initially state that reliance is not required, but proceed to suggest
that it is required, either expressly or through some kind of inducement. Moreover,
these cases may very well cite each other as authority. 0 5
It is not my purpose here to explore what the drafters
intended;10 6 rather, I invoke the confused state of the law on this issue
simply to demonstrate that in some cases, there is no "right" answer to
the question posed. Sometimes legislative views cannot plausibly be
ascertained in a way that cleanly resolves issues of statutory
interpretation, many of which were unforeseen when the statute was
enacted. Similarly, the resolution of common law issues may not be
susceptible to a clear decision one way or the other. The choice of rules
or their application must often make reference to considerations of
both fact and policy on which reasonable minds may differ.
For these reasons, it would at least be plausible to suggest that
the process of appellate review, under the best of circumstances,
cannot be defended as a necessary check on the correctness of lower
104. What the drafters of the Code intended by the phrase "basis of the bargain" has been a
source of perpetual confusion. See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5 (5th ed. 2000).
The extent to which the law has so been changed is thoroughly unclear. It is possible
that the drafters did not intend to change the law, or that they intended to remove the
reliance requirement in all but the most unusual case, or that they intended simply to
give the plaintiff the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of reliance.
Id.; see also 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT: STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 393 (reprint ed. 1980) (" '[B]asis of the bargain' does not convey a definite
meaning.").
105. John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain" Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 283, 304 (1982).
106. I do think, however, that it is vital to an intelligent interpretation of the basis-of-the-
bargain requirement that one consider the comments to section 2-313. Comment 3 states that
"no particular reliance on [affirmations of fact] need be shown in order to weave them into the
fabric of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2002). Comment 7 also argues against the need
to prove reliance. § 2-313 cmt. 7. It provides that "[tihe precise time when words of description or
affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material .... If language is used after the
closing of the deal ... the warranty becomes a modification." § 2-313(1). By recognizing the
possibility that warranties can arise after the sale has been completed, this comment takes a
position which is presumably inconsistent with the idea that a buyer is required to show some
sort of reliance on the seller's statements.
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court decisions. After all, if several possible outcomes could result
from a judicial determination, given certain contingencies, does this
not undermine the claim that the right to an appeal helps to assure
litigants that their case was decided by the proper application of the
correct legal principle? If there is no "right" answer to legal questions,
then would it not be foolish to assume that any one court is more or
less capable as a decisionmaker than any other court? And if, as the
result of the increased number of appellate cases, these same courts
cannot devote the same level of judicial energy to each as they once
did, is that not another reason to be skeptical of the likelihood that
appellate courts are performing a valuable correcting function? 10 7
Nevertheless, there are at least three objections to the view
that error correction is no longer a proper function of an appellate
court. First, even if one were to accept the idea that legal outcomes are
neither right nor wrong in absolute terms, a defender of appellate
review might contend that possible outcomes could be ranked along a
continuum, such that one can be seen as "better" or "worse" than a
competing outcome.108 The law-defining function of the appellate
court calls into play a competence that is distinctly structural, one
that does not require us to hew to an idealized vision of appellate
practice. Even in its modern guise, the fact remains that "three heads
are better than one" and that "nine heads are better than three."10 9
107. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 6-7.
These heavy increases in workload threaten the ability of the appellate courts to
perform their functions.. Adequate performance of the correcting function requires
personal involvement and attention to detail by the judges which cannot be provided
by judges whose attentions and energies are divided among too many cases. In many
different ways a wasting process is set in motion. The process can for the moment be
termed a trend toward bureaucratization. Changes which are characteristic of any
shift from individually crafted works to mass production methods can be seen to be
occurring in appellate processes and institutions. Projected to their conceivable
extremes, these changes would leave an appellate process which gives little or no
assurance to individual litigants that the appeal has served the correcting function.
Id.
108. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 845 (1994) ("[L]egal questions admit of 'better' and 'worse'
answers."); Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference
to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 920 n.128 (1989) ("[O]ur society
properly believes that one legal outcome in actual cases is as a rule superior to others. If this
were not true, courts could resolve legal disputes by coin flip.").
109. According to Professor Caminker, this conclusion is statistically mandated:
Assuming (quite reasonably) that each individual judge has a greater than fifty
percent of arriving at the "correct" answer in any given legal dispute, then the larger
the panel the greater the likelihood that a majority of them will reach the correct
result, even if each judge decides independently without consulting the others .... Of
course at some point increased size can frustrate collaboration and creativity. But at
current staffing levels, my sense is that collegial deliberation within larger courts
marginally adds to the purely numerical argument that nine heads are better than
three heads are better than one.
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Second, the charge that appellate judicial outcomes are
arbitrary, subject to manipulation, or meaningless ignores the
potential palliative effect of the right to an appeal for litigants who
may harbor concerns that the system is somehow rigged against them.
Viewed in this way, recourse to at least one higher tribunal is a
powerful antidote to the crisis of confidence that might otherwise
result from having one's case ultimately settled by a single individual,
whose decision may be perceived as the product of personal attitudes
and values. 10  Indeed, such a perception finds support in the
predominant model of judicial decisionmaking, which rests on the
assumption that judges, like most other decisionmakers in political
institutions, render their decisions based on their attitudes and
values."' Thus, the notion that behavior is predicated solely on
external legal stimuli is explicitly rejected." 2 By contrast, review by
an appellate court has the comparative virtue of a multipartite effort
that generally finds expression in a written opinion." 3 Understood in
this way, it becomes apparent that outcomes are not all that matter;
the process by which those outcomes are achieved is important as
well.
Caminker, supra note 108, at 847.
110. See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 2 ("The availability of the appellate
process assures.., litigants that the decision in their case is not prey to the failings of whichever
mortal happened to render it, but bears the institutional imprimatur and approval of the whole
social order as represented by its legal system."); MARTINEAU, supra note 61, at 19 ("Error
correction is intended to protect [litigants] from the arbitrariness in the administration of
justice.").
111. See James L. Gibson, Judges'Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive
Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911, 912 (1978) ("There is little question that the predominant
paradigm of judicial decision making places judges' attitudes in the center of the process. Indeed,
it is not an overstatement to assert that attitudinal approaches have become the traditional
nontraditional mode of judicial analysis.").
112. See, e.g., Glendon Schubert, Judicial Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of
the United States Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 135 (1963) ("[Variance in the
voting behavior of the [J]ustices during the 1961 Term can be adequately accounted for by the
differences in their attitudes towards the fundamental issues of civil liberty and economic
liberalism."); Joseph Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1583, 1583 (1966) ("[V]alue structure leads to judicial attitudes, to predispositions toward
deciding given types of cases in particular ways. A judge may, for example, be predisposed to
support-or to deny-legal claims by labor unions, criminal defendants, racial minorities, federal
regulatory agencies, or state and local authorities."). The recent presidential election has, no
doubt, had the unfortunate consequence of persuading many people that legal decisions are
motivated by partisan interests rather than legal propriety.
113. A published opinion is the primary way that a court informs the parties and the public
that the outcome was not tyrannically imposed, but was reached for rational reasons. See
Thompson & Oakley, supra note 73, at 28 ("The primary purpose of an opinion of no precedential
value is to inform the parties and counsel of the reasons for the appellate decision, and to signify
that the result has been reached by a rational process.").
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Finally, the error-correcting function may derive value from
the causal relationship between possible appellate review and the
behavior of lower-court judges. Assuming that a judge deciding a
case-like anyone making a decision-would not relish the thought of
being told that she was wrong, the possibility of having her decision
reversed on appeal imposes a cost and becomes a consideration in
rendering judgments. In theory, lower-court judges, as a result, would
be more likely to choose outcomes solidly based on legal justifications
traceable to past decisions or statutes. Thus, appellate review
enhances the rationality of lower court decisionmaking by introducing
the prospect of institutional censure: certain judicial choices can be
constrained by the fact that some options have already been ruled out,
or are likely to be ruled out, by a higher court. 114
All of these concerns might suggest that appellate review of
issues involving the law of foreign jurisdictions should be handled in
the same fashion as issues of local law. The question is somewhat
more complex, however, than the discussion thus far suggests.
Standards of appellate review are best defended in part as a sensible
response to the comparative advantages of the various tiers of
courts. 11 5 Appellate courts defer to decisions of the trial court as to
matters within the trial court's competence and should only review
independently those matters not so situated. The line between
independent review and deference, then, should turn on relative
competence. If so, a trial court decision based on local law would not
warrant deference; there the expertise resulting from continual
exposure of the appellate court to the law of the forum state may
render the appellate court the more competent body to decide legal
issues. By contrast, this special expertise may not be a factor when the
law that must be applied is the law of a foreign jurisdiction with which
the appellate court is not as familiar. In the latter instance, the case
for the application of a de novo standard of review may not be quite as
compelling.
To make this idea concrete, consider whether a federal district
court's resolution of an unsettled state law issue is entitled to special
deference on appeal. For a number of years following the Supreme
Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 16 this question
bedeviled federal courts of appeals, especially after the Supreme Court
made it clear in Meredith v. Winter Haven'1 7 that the state law issue
114. See, e.g., MARTINEAU, supra note 61, at 20.
115. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
116. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring a federal judges sitting in diversity to apply the
substantive law of the forum state).
117. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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had to be resolved one way or another-i.e., that a court could not
avoid its responsibility under Erie by abstaining from hearing the
case. 118 The first elaboration of the view that there may be something
inherently different about difficult state law determinations emerged
when Justice Frankfurter, in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,119
delivered an opinion that expressly acknowledged that the standard of
review must take into account the relative legal competence of the
trial and appellate courts:
Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special
competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent judgment
regarding the application of that law to the present situation .... [The decision below]
represents the view of an able and experienced circuit judge of the circuit which includes
Texas and of two capable district judges trained in Texas law. Had we or they no choice
in the matter but to decide what is the law of the state, we should hesitate long before
rejecting their forecast of Texas law.1 20
Underlying this more restrictive grant to appellate courts of power to
substitute their judgment for that of a lower court is the Supreme
Court's belief that the superior expertise rationale for a strict de novo
standard of review is diminished by the reviewing court's lack of
familiarity with the applicable law.
In the aftermath of the Pullman case, courts of appeals
endeavored to balance the de novo standard of review and its
traditional withholding of deference to district court legal views with a
concern that appellate judges may have less experience in local law
matters than district court judges and that this inexperience would
increase the likelihood of an incorrect answer to the question posed.121
118. Id. at 234 ("[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter
determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court
to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for
decision.").
119. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
120. Id. at 499. Because the Court ultimately held that the three-judge district court should
have abstained from resolving the issue until it had been considered by the Texas state courts,
Justice Frankfurter's words are no more than dicta. Id. at 499-500.
121. This belief was also expressed in Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991)
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That the experience of
appellate judges should lead them to rely, in appropriate situations, on the experience of district
judges who have practiced law in the state in which they sit before taking the bench seems quite
natural."), and in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) ("Since the
federal judge making those findings is from the Vermont bar, we give special weight to his
statement of what the Vermont law is."). Another good example of this point of view is the
dissenting opinion of Judge Schroeder in In re McLinn:
[Differences exist between the appellate and district courts in their respective
relationships to the law of a particular state. As a practical matter district judges hear
a great number of cases involving the law of their home states. This court's appellate
jurisdiction, on the other hand, encompasses nine states, and questions of state law
arise from all of them.
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Focusing on this concern, a majority of these courts afforded
considerable deference to district judge state law rulings. 122 More
recently, however, the Supreme Court ended this practice in Salve
Regina College v. Russell.123 In a strongly worded opinion, the Court
underscored its belief that Erie foreclosed the possibility of treating
issues of state law differently from issues of federal law:
[D]eferential appellate review invites divergent development of state law among the
federal trial courts even within a single State .... Moreover, by denying a litigant access
to meaningful review of state-law claims, appellate courts that defer to the district
courts' state-law determinations create a dual system of enforcement of state-created
rights, in which the substantive rule applied to a dispute may depend on the choice of
forum.... Neither of these results, unavoidable in the absence of independent appellate
review, can be reconciled with the commands of Erie.'24
[T]he proposition that a district court judge is better able to "intuit" the answer to an
unsettled question of state law is foreclosed by our holding in Erie.125
Even so, the Russell Court would not indict all decisions to
reallocate judicial authority among courts in cases involving
particular legal issues. 126 Surely, for example, Erie does not preclude
a state appellate court from concluding that a different appellate
process is warranted when reviewing a trial court's determination of
foreign law. 127  In this context, however, an exception to the
traditional standard of de novo review would rest not on the perceived
expertise of the trial judge but on the recognition that there is no
"expert" decisionmaker. If comparative legal expertise is what triggers
de novo review, then it makes sense to let the lower court's decision
stand unless it is clearly in error.
Finally, the realities of the appellate system make actual error
correction much less likely than the abstract theory suggests. Recent
empirical evidence suggests that the congested calendar of appellate
739 F.2d 1395, 1405 (1984).
122. For a circuit-by-circuit review of the rule of deference, see Coenen, supra note 108, at
963-1021.
123. 499 U.S. 225 (1991).
124. Id. at 234.
125. Id. at 238.
126. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court also relied on other factors, Russell is best
viewed as an Erie case, plain and simple. Once the Court concluded that the principle in Erie
was inconsistent with the deferential standard of review, these other factors were no longer
relevant.
127. Although there are no cases directly on point, it can be argued that if the state law
claim is litigated in federal court, the Erie doctrine dictates that state law, not federal law, will
control the standard of review and other related issues. See Coenen, supra note 108, at 955, 957-
58.
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courts not only adversely affects their competence to properly decide
cases, 128 but also profoundly affects their willingness even to try. 129
In summary, just as it has long been considered inefficacious
for federal courts to apply a de novo standard of review for questions
of state law, so, too, would it be inefficacious to use that same
standard when state courts are called upon to resolve questions of
foreign law. Once the error-correcting function of appellate review is
seen to involve not just the questionable belief in the comparative
legal expertise of higher courts, but also the unfortunate effects of
overcrowded dockets, the case for continuing to treat all issues of law
the same, whether based on local or foreign law, unravels. As a
practical matter, the costs of a uniform appellate process outweigh its
benefits.130
B. The Law Development Function of Appellate Courts Revisited
Some have argued that, although the error-correcting function
may be one reason courts of appeal exist, the essence of appellate
review lies in serving the institutional function of law development.131
No one has emphasized this function more than Judge John Parker:
The judicial function in its essence is the application of the rules and standards of
organized society to the settlement of controversies, and for there to be any proper
administration of justice these rules and standards must be applied, not only
impartially, but also objectively and uniformly throughout the territory of the state.
This requires that decisions of trial courts be subjected to review by a panel of judges
who are removed from the heat engendered by the trial and are consequently in a
position to take a more objective view of the questions there raised to maintain
uniformity of decisions throughout the territory. 
132
128. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969) (describing
problems in the administration of appellate courts, and arguing that the volume of cases may
hinder their ability to reach proper decisions).
129. See, e.g., Matthew E. Gabrys, A Shift in the Bottleneck: The Appellate Caseload Problem
Twenty Years After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1547, 1582-
83 (1998) (examining the affirmance and reversal rates over the past twenty years and
concluding that "the court of appeals becomes more of a 'rubber stamp' as the number of cases in
its docket grows").
130. For a discussion of some of the costs of appellate review, see infra notes 137-49 and
accompanying text.
131. The institutional function is discussed supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
132. John Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1950). Professor
Charles Alan Wright has explored at length what he describes as the philosophical question of
what is the proper function of an appellate court. Wright, supra note 65, at 779.
From the earliest times appellate courts have been empowered to reverse for errors of
law, to announce the rules which are to be applied, and to ensure uniformity in the
rules applied by various inferior tribunals.... The controversial question is whether
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It is tempting to say that, even if de novo review of issues of foreign
law cannot be justified by a need to correct the mistakes committed by
lower courts, such review certainly remains necessary to advance the
twin institutional goals of achieving uniform judicial interpretation of
state law and permitting the common law to evolve to correct for a
world of changing conditions. The fact that people consider these
institutional goals to be important, though, does not mean that a de
novo standard is the optimal or appropriate framework for
accomplishing them.
Here, the doctrine of stare decisis is again relevant. In common
circumstances, a court should adhere to its own precedent and is
absolutely required to rule consistently with a superior court's
precedent. 33 This fundamental principle is crucial to the institutional
goals of appellate review, which would be unobtainable if courts could
freely exercise their autonomy when deciding individual cases.
Suppose it were legally permissible for each state court to behave
according to its own best view of what the law is, unbound by all prior
precedent. No one would seriously doubt that if such a legal regime
existed, even intrastate uniformity and predictability would be
unattainable, and the creative development of the law would
inevitably sputter from case to case. To the extent that the
institutional ends of appellate review are normatively compelling, the
requirement of fidelity to precedent is normatively warranted as well.
In light of this, appellate decisions involving the law of a
foreign jurisdiction are least likely to have any lasting effect beyond
the effect on the parties to the case. In other words, there is no
institutional value in these decisions. Consider, for example, a case
filed in Virginia involving an unsettled issue of California law. Given
that Virginia rulings do not bind state courts outside of Virginia, the
decision in this case would be unlikely to result in any real
contribution to uniformity or predictability. A California court, when
appellate courts have a second function, that of ensuring that justice is done in a
particular case.
Id. Skeptical that decisions by reviewing courts are necessarily "correct" and cognizant that
appeals can be costly, Wright concludes:
There is no way to know for sure whether trial courts or appellate courts are more
often right. But in the absence of a clear showing that broadened appellate review
leads to better justice, a showing which I think has not been made and probably
cannot be made, the cost of increased appellate review, in terms of time and expense
to the parties, in terms of lessened confidence in the trial judge, and in terms of
positive injustice to those who cannot appeal, seems to me clearly exorbitant.
Id. at 782.
133. Some have used the term stare decisis to describe the first obligation only, and refer to
the second as "hierarchical precedent." See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 108, at 818 n.1. In this
Article, I use the former term broadly to capture both obligations.
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subsequently presented with the identical issue, is permitted-indeed,
must-decide for itself what the law of its own state is or should be.
Since California courts would necessarily be more familiar with
California's jurisprudence, and would therefore be in the best position
to have the knowledge needed to decide the issue in question, one
might reasonably expect that this comparative advantage would
increase the possibility of a substantive disagreement with the
Virginia court. Indeed, if the federal courts' track record as to rulings
on state law is any indication, there is every reason to believe that the
California courts would give the Virginia ruling little, if any, weight. 134
Even in Virginia, the ruling would have little institutional
value. Properly understood, the decision rendered by the Virginia
court was no more than a prophesy of what the result would have been
had the case been decided in California. It was not necessarily an
expression of the court's actual preference for a particular result. This
fact is an unavoidable by-product of the Erie-type analysis the
Virginia court must perform in a choice-of-law context. 135 Therefore,
no Virginia court would consider itself bound to resolve the issue in
the same way in a later case involving Virginia law. Thus, the absence
of any precedential value at a minimum fails to contribute to, and may
even undercut, uniformity and predictability. As a result, we are left
with a decision that provides none of the benefits normally associated
with the institutional justification for appellate review. 136
134. An empirical illustration is provided by the way in which Judge Brown relates the poor
reception with which Fifth Circuit decisions have been received by state courts:
Though our decisions survive the discretionary review of certiorari, most of the time
because they are really not "certworthy," . . . many of them do not fare so well when
they are tested in the place that really counts-the highest, or first-writing court, of
the State concerned.... Within the very recent past, both Texas and Alabama have
overruled decisions of this court, and the score in Florida cases is little short of
staggering.
United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). For a small sampling of federal decisions interpreting state law
that were rebutted by subsequent state court decisions, see Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131
So.2d 730 (Fla. 1961) (rejecting Pogue v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957));
Arrington v. N.Y. Times, 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982) (rejecting Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d
319 (2d Cir. 1978)); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250 (1960) (rejecting Nat'l Sur. Corp.
v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957)).
135. When a federal court is confronted with unsettled state law, Judge Frank suggested
that the appropriate question to ask is "[w]hat would be the decision of reasonable intelligent
lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest [state] court, and fully conversant with the [state's]
'jurisprudence.' " Cooper v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945). In short, the
court's job is to predict a result, not to break new ground according to its own preference.
136. This critique of the institutional benefits of appellate review of foreign law should not be
confused with the values or institutional justifications underlying review of applications of
otherwise inapplicable local law chosen by the parties to govern their relationship. Consider the
case in which the parties to a transaction that is not governed by the U.C.C. decide to opt into
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IV. REJECTING THE DE Novo STANDARD OF REVIEW IN A FOREIGN LAW
SETTING
Having examined the functions of appellate adjudication, the
ways in which the traditional standards of review advance-or fail to
advance-the purposes of appellate courts, and the particularly
ineffective application of appellate review to questions of foreign law,
the framework is now in place to argue that when appellate review is
viewed in the broader context of resource allocation and the problems
caused by bloated caseloads, decisions implicating foreign law should
be reviewed under a deferential standard. This part identifies the
ways in which use of the deferential standard can conserve judicial
resources and demonstrates that its use poses no more potential harm
to the parties than is realized in other contexts in which judicial
review is limited.
A. The Conservation of Judicial Resources
My main purpose here is to show that standards of review
deeply influence the fiscal resources consumed by the appellate
process. Identification of the totality of costs is best left for others, but
the following discussion sketches a few of the potential costs that
would surely be affected by a change in the applicable standard.
To begin with, the states' strong incentives to mitigate the
growing caseload pressure on appellate courts 137 arise not only from
the adverse effects of the overload of cases on the quality of appellate
justice, 138 but also from the fact that appeals are always expensive.
Not only are financial costs incurred by the parties in prosecuting and
defending the appeal, but valuable institutional resources must be
devoted to dealing with crowded appellate dockets. Moreover, overall
costs cannot be accurately captured through a model of appellate
practice that treats the appeal itself as the only significant event. This
perspective excludes what might be called consequential costs-
the U.C.C. See, for example, U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2 (2002): "Moreover, consistent with the
principles stated in Section 1.102(2)(b), the immediate parties to an order or promise that is not
an instrument may provide by agreement that one or more of the provisions of Article 3
determine their rights and obligations under the writing." Since the appellate court would be
applying the law of its own state, traditional notions of precedent would not be out of place in
these contexts.
137. There are no signs that the current rate of increase in the number of cases is likely to
subside in the near future. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 127 ("If forced to speculate,
our intuition is that the number of appeals will continue to rise episodically in the foreseeable
future.").
138. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
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namely, the costs incurred as a result of the particular outcome of the
appeal. For example, if the decision of the trial court is reversed, the
initial appeal may be followed by a remand, a second trial, and further
appeals. 139 The true price we must pay for appeals is more fully
revealed when the post-appeal period of further litigation is
considered.
Some writers blame the current crisis in caseload volume on
the appellate courts themselves, claiming that they have taken bold
steps to expand their jurisdiction deliberately. 140 These commentators
charge that appellate courts increased their power by the simple
expediency of recasting issues traditionally considered factual as
issues of law.141 This recasting made it possible for appellate courts to
review matters that had long been decided by trial courts and juries
without appellate intervention.1 42 The problem is not limited to the
broadened scope of appellate review; it also encompasses the inability
or unwillingness of appellate courts to deal directly with their
caseloads in a way that would not result in unacceptable sacrifice. In
this vein, Dean Uelmen aptly articulates where the fault for the
current situation lies and who bears primary responsibility for finding
a solution. 143 He explains:
[J]udges who accommodate overload by publishing fewer opinions, delegating more
decisions to their staff, and generally allowing the quality of their work product to
decline are their own worst enemies. They should be in flashing armor, leading the
march of reinforcements over the hilltop. They should be the loudest voices calling for
appellate reform, instead of the ardent defenders of the status quo. When it comes to the
broth of appellate reform, our judges must be the chefs. And the broth will not be spoiled
by too many chefs.144
How, then, are appellate courts to reduce the amount of
appellate litigation? One response is to create a more efficient judicial
system by reducing the number of cases that make their way to the
courts. With fewer cases entering the system, there would logically be
a corresponding decrease in the volume of appeals. There are
essentially three possible methods by which this could be
accomplished: (1) reform substantive law to make rights more
139. See Jeffrey C. Alexander, Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in
the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 183 (1985) (discussing the costs associated with de novo
review of federal district court determinations of state law, the author points to "the resources
consumed in the remand and retrial of actions ... as well as the time required to hear additional
appeals").
140. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Uelmen, supra note 63, at 603.
144. Id.
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certain; 145 (2) stem the creation of new substantive rights; 146 and (3)
direct disputes to nonjudicial agencies. 147 We need not now assess the
relative strengths of these solutions. Nor need we evaluate whether
they would have socially desirable consequences or attempt to fashion
other methods of inhibiting the urge to litigate without deterring other
valuable goals. None of this discussion is necessary to understand the
more central point: Appellate courts can reduce congestion by
decreasing the incentives to appeal. The cleanest way to achieve this
result would be to limit reversals to serious errors of law.
Any change in the applicable standard of review that reduces a
litigant's chances of a successful appeal has the potential to decrease
appellate litigation. Simply put, litigants can be expected to appeal
less frequently if they face a lower, or no, expected financial payoff.148
Thus, if the practice of appellate courts were to uphold routinely trial
court determinations of foreign law with little scrutiny, so long as they
had some rational basis, losing parties would be far less willing to pay
for the opportunity to argue for reversal. Conversely, if appellate
courts continue to evaluate such verdicts with a de novo review, then
there is no reason to anticipate any reduction in the number of cases.
Consequently, choices among multiple standards of review can
directly affect the size of the appellate docket.
Another factor militating for use of a deferential standard of
review in this area is the potential for increased efficiency in deciding
those appeals that are, in fact, taken. Costs would be saved by
creating a setting in which judicial involvement in appeals is sharply
curtailed by turning problematic issues into routine affirmances. Of
course, this justification for altering the standard of review lacks
empirical demonstration. If we believe that appellate courts are best
situated to judge for themselves what the probable effects would be,
though, we can certainly anticipate that at least some savings will be
achieved. For example, the Ninth Circuit has proclaimed in the
context of reviewing state law determinations by district courts that
[i]t can hardly be disputed that application of a nondeferential standard of review
requires a greater investment of appellate resources [than] does application of the
clearly erroneous standard. Appellate courts could do their work more quickly if they
applied the clearly erroneous standard in most circumstances, because the courts then
145. See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 63, at 124 ("[L]egislators may remove the core of
conflict from established types of dispute by simply redefining the right in terms so absolute that
it is placed beyond serious challenge.").
146. See id. at 125 (suggesting that "lawmakers should study the impact of new legislation
on the courts").
147. See id. at 122-23.
148. See id. at 133-34 (observing that one way to "reduce the rate of appeal is to increase the
costs, financial or non-economic, of the appeal").
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need only determine if the lower court's decision is a reasonable one, not substitute their
own judgment for that of the trial judge. 49
A plausible argument can be made that the consumption of
institutional resources per appeal would be sharply reduced if a
stricter standard of review were adopted.
The approach that I have in mind is illustrated by the analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in Leavitt v. Jane.150 In Leavitt, the
Court confronted a decision by the Tenth Circuit that invalidated a
provision of a Utah statute that regulated abortions ending
pregnancies of more than twenty weeks. 15' The Tenth Circuit based
its decision not on the unconstitutionality of this particular provision,
but rather on the unconstitutionality of a companion provision
regulating earlier abortions. 52 The lower court reasoned that the two
provisions were not severable, even though the statute contained a
clear statement that the legislature intended otherwise.153 In the view
of the court of appeals, severing the provisions would have frustrated
the statute's overarching purpose to prohibit most abortions. 54
The Supreme Court disagreed. 15 5  Rebuking the court of
appeals for giving too little weight to the language of the statutory
savings clause, the Court left little doubt that severability is a product
of the legislature's implicit or explicit instructions. 156 Here the state
legislature had directly addressed the precise question at issue. 57 In
addition, nothing in the statute or its history suggested that its
purpose would be undermined if only part of the statute were
149. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 824 (1984).
150. 518 U.S. 137 (1996).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 138.
153. Id. The Utah statute provided as follows:
If any one or more provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word of
this part or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be
unconstitutional, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the balance of this
part shall remain effective notwithstanding such unconstitutionality. The legislature
hereby declares that it would have passed this part, and each provision, section,
subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any
one or more provision, section, subsection, sentence clause, phrase, or word be
declared unconstitutional.
Id. at 139-40 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-317 (1995)).
154. Id. at 140.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 141-42.
157. Id. at 140 ("The Court of Appeal's opinion not only did not regard the explicit language
of § 317 as determinative-it did not even use it as the point of departure for addressing the
severability question.").
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invalidated.158 These considerations were sufficient for the Court to
dispose of the question.
At the same time, Leavitt is in tension with the deeply
ingrained principle that the Supreme Court normally refrains from
reviewing decisions grounded in state law. Indeed, the Court itself
recognized that this time-honored principle remains valid and entitled
to respect. 15 9 Nevertheless, the Court held that a lower court's views
about state law will not be permitted to stand, or perhaps more
generally, that a court's view will not warrant deference, when it is
clearly wrong. 160 In a decision peppered with extraordinarily strong
language-including "plainly error,"161 "unsupportable,"' 162 "blatant
federal-court nullification of state law,"163 "overreaching,"'' 64 and
"plainly wrong" 165-the Court sharply criticized the Tenth Circuit's
opinion and pronounced its willingness to review state law cases with
especially serious mistakes. 66  The Court's effort to explain its
decision to review the case can be seen as part of the continuing and
much larger enterprise of sorting out the relationship among courts in
the federal system.
For the reasons suggested above, state courts should endorse
the principle of appellate court restraint-and the limitations on that
principle embodied in Leavitt-where foreign law must be applied in
the forum jurisdiction.167 It is not necessary, however, to conclude, as
a matter of civil procedure, that rulings on foreign law are findings of
158. Id. at 142.
159. Id. at 144 ("To be sure, we do not normally grant petitions for certiorari solely to review
what purports to be an application of state law .
160. Id. at 144-45.
161. Id. at 144.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 145.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 144-45.
167. Indeed, this form of appellate court restraint would not be altogether new in some
jurisdictions. Current U.C.C. section 1-102(2)(c) and Revised U.C.C. section 1-103(a)(3) both
state that one of the Code's underlying purposes and policies is "to make uniform the law among
various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (2002); Rev. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (2001). One way for
courts to promote the goal of uniformity, especially when deciding issues of first impression in
the forum jurisdiction, is to follow decisions elsewhere on the issues considered unless those
decisions are considered clearly wrong. See, e.g., In re Webster Kreling v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Mich., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 802, 805 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1976) (noting that to keep
the law uniform, a decision from a foreign jurisdiction should be followed unless that decision "is
clearly wrong"). It would certainly be ironic if deference were given to foreign law in this context
where the foreign law is adopted and becomes the law of the forum jurisdiction, but to not give
deference where foreign law is applied pursuant to a contractual choice-of-law provision and
would have no effect whatsoever on the law of the forum.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:57
fact under the state law counterparts to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and thus automatically reviewable under a clearly
erroneous standard. 168 At least in the analogous context of state law
determinations by federal courts, the deference standard was never
dependent upon the application of Rule 52(a). 169 Instead, it was the
result of an inquiry into questions of both policy and principle. Thus,
for example, it was said by the Tenth Circuit that district court
decisions involving issues of state law should or must be reviewed on
the basis of an assessment of whether the ruling was "clearly
erroneous,"'170 "clearly wrong,"'17 or "clear error,"172 or on appeal was
entitled to "extraordinary force,"' 73 "extraordinary weight," 174 "great
weight,"' 75  "substantial weight,"' 76  "great deference,"' 77  or
"deference."'178 All this raises doubts as to whether any verbal
formulation will be completely helpful, relying as it must on terms
infused with subjective content. Nevertheless, perhaps this rule will
suffice: If plausible support exists for the trial court's legal decision,
that decision should be accorded validity, whether or not the
168. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-52(a) (1993); KY. R.C.P. Rule 52.01; N.D.R.C.P. Rule
52(a). To be sure, a few cases have held that where the legal evidence is conflicting, laws of other
states must be proved as facts are proved and, in a trial by jury, left to the jury to decide as a
fact. See, e.g., Ufford v. Spaulding, 30 N.E. 360 (Mass. 1892); Bondi Bros. v. Holbrook Grocery
Co., 118 A. 486 (Vt. 1922). Most other cases, however, point in the opposite direction, holding
that the law of a foreign country or sister state is a question of law to be determined by the court.
See, e.g., Cable Co. v. McElhoe 108 N.E. 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 1915); Slaughter v. Metro. St. Ry. Co.
23 S.W. 760 (Mo. 1893). Of course, the factors that determine whether the issue initially should
go to judge or jury do not necessarily dictate the scope of review. See, e.g., Ram Constr. Co. v.
Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that "assignment to judge or jury
does not of itself determine the standard of review to be applied on appeal").
169. At least one commentator thought that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52 did
embrace state law determinations. See Alexander, supra note 139, at 180-86. But see Coenen,
supra note 108, at 919-20 (concluding that "the language of the 'clearly erroneous' rule-limiting
its application specifically to 'findings of fact'-provides the surest signal that the rule's drafters
intended neither in fact nor in spirit to construct a standard of review for state law
determinations").
170. See, e.g., King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983).
171. See, e.g., Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1978).
172. See, e.g., Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 614 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1980).
173. See, e.g., Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1983).
174. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807, 816 (10th Cir.
1977).
175. See, e.g., Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1976).
176. See, e.g., Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567, 571 (10th Cir.
1979).
177. See, e.g., Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th
Cir. 1977).
178. See, e.g., Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water
Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984).
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reviewing court would otherwise accept the trial court's view as
correct.
B. The Absence of Harm to Litigants
If a more restrictive standard of review for decisions
implicating foreign law would help reduce or control appellate
caseloads, would it necessarily serve the best interests of society? The
efficient use of appellate resources is, to be sure, one important goal.
But it is not the only such goal, and the overzealous pursuit of
efficiency could seriously undermine the achievement of other equally
important goals. Society needs a system for resolving disputes that
inspires public confidence that cases will be decided correctly and
justice achieved. Litigants must understand themselves to be
protected from judicial arbitrariness and caprice. If one goal is allowed
to eclipse the others, the justice system will suffer. Hence, the
question is whether a modified standard of review in limited
circumstances is likely to interfere with these other goals. Undesired
practical consequences are always a risk when law is changed. For at
least the following four reasons, however, it seems quite unlikely that
this proposal would cause harm.
First, a reasonably veridical picture of the actual (rather than
the assumed or asserted) consequences of a strict standard of review
can be gleaned from the experience of the federal courts before Salve
Regina College v. Russell, when substantial deference was accorded to
district court determinations of state law. 179 The Supreme Court
ended this practice because appellate deference was inconsistent with
its decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, not because of concerns
that the justice system was somehow suffering.180 In fact, having
applied the deferential standard for several decades in diversity cases,
some members of the Court still considered it to be a "well-functioning
approach."181 Apparently, the district courts were doing a satisfactory
job of deciding cases prior to Russell and there had been no
discernable adverse influence on the perceived legitimacy of the
appellate process. Surely, had there been evidence of undesirable
consequences, the Court would have bolstered its decision further by
noting in its opinion that these ill effects would also be eliminated as a
result of its holding. In short, what was not said in Russell hints at
179. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 242 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined
by White, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
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minimal consequences to the litigation system of a standard of greater
deference.
Second, notwithstanding that appellate review in a civil case
has never been held to be a constitutional requirement of due process,
it is widely recognized that appeals are an integral part of the
litigation system.18 2 Accordingly, almost every state recognizes the
right of each litigant to have the trial court judgment reviewed by at
least one appellate court. In those jurisdictions where there is no
intermediate appellate court hierarchically situated between the trial
court and supreme court,18 3 the highest state court will hear appeals
from the trial court without significant discretion in deciding which
cases to consider.184
Virginia is the only state where there is no appeal as of right in
most civil cases.18 5 There, the intermediate appellate court hears
primarily criminal cases, and the supreme court has the flexibility to
determine its own docket.18 6  Historically, however, discretionary
review by the Supreme Court of Virginia was never exercised in such
a way as to leave standing a decision that was in error. A description
of the error-correcting role of the supreme court was well put by the
court itself almost a century ago in McCue v. Commonwealth:
We have no such practice as an absolute right of appeal in civil or criminal cases. But
the law requires a petition, accompanied by a transcript of the record, to be presented to
the court, or one of its judges, whose duty it is to examine the errors assigned and to
grant or refuse a writ, as may seem proper. It is as much the duty of the court, or judge,
to deny the petition when of the opinion that the decision complained of is plainly right
as it is to grant it when any doubt exists as to the propriety of the decision. The statute
in its present form is found in the Code of 1849. Just when it took its place in the statute
we are not informed, but the uniform practice of this court, and of the General Court, its
predecessor, as an appellate tribunal in criminal cases has been in accordance with the
letter and spirit of that statute.18 7
182. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
183. There are now eighteen such jurisdictions: Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. MARLIN 0. OSTHUS, STATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS 26-50 (2d ed. 1980).
Since the foregoing was written, an intermediate appellate court was created in Virginia to hear
criminal appeals and a narrow range of civil cases. See Richard B. Hoffman & William M.
Lucianovic, Long Range Planning: A Reality in the Judicial Branch, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1599,
1608 (1995).
184. See STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE COURTS:
PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES 58 (1979).
185. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF VIRGINIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, COURTS IN
TRANSITION 37-38 (1989).
186. See Graham C. Lilly & Antonin Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L.
REV. 3, 6-11 (1971).
187. 49 S.E. 623, 632 (Va. 1905).
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Thus, discretionary review was not truly discretionary in practice. At
the time, the court articulated this broad conception of its statutory
duty, although it was not overburdened by the number of cases it was
called upon to adjudicate.
Today things are quite different in Virginia. No longer does the
court's workload permit it to scrutinize every case for the presence of
prejudicial error and to perform its error-correcting function
routinely.188 It has been suggested, in light of the available statistical
information, that the Supreme Court of Virginia has moved from a
"merits" determination of which cases to hear to a determination
based on the societal importance of the issues presented.18 9 This
insight suggests that a significant number of potential appellants with
valid grounds to appeal never initiate an appeal or, if they do, have
their petitions denied. 190 This development would cry out for inquiry
and change if the judicial system were no longer accomplishing its
purposes or if there were a gap between expectations and actual
performance of the system. Yet the matter has not received serious
attention. One can infer that the system is doing a reasonable job of
providing compensation to those who have a right to be compensated
and denying it to those who do not. Because having essentially no
opportunity to appeal is unquestionably worse for the aggrieved party
than being able to appeal under a less favorable standard of review, it
is reasonable to assume that the recommended change would produce
benefits that would outweigh its costs.
Third, evidence suggests that voluntary commercial arbitration
is a growth industry.191 Parties in commercial contexts may elect
188. See Lilly & Scalia, supra note 186, at 10 ("The unavoidable conclusion.., is that the
Supreme Court of Appeals is laboring under a much greater caseload than it bore twelve years
ago. There is, of course, even a greater disproportion between the volume of its present business
and the volume envisioned in 1928, when its present structure and its operating procedures were
established.").
189. Id. at 15 ("It is in any event beyond question that the Court is now declining to review
cases in which it once would have considered that a substantial possibility of error existed.").
190. Id. at 57 ("The ability to deny review has enabled the Court to... discourage filing
petitions for appeal.").
191. See, e.g., Stephen A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (Feb.
1985) (stating that American Arbitration Association's use of arbitration has doubled in the last
decade). The American Arbitration Association's President, Robert Coulson, observed that "more
commercial claims are arbitrated than tried before a jury." Id. Moreover, commercial arbitration
is not confined to traditional commercial transactions such as the sale and purchase of
commodities and manufactured goods, and issues in the maritime field. It is also used
to decide controversies arising out of building and engineering contracts, agency and
distribution arrangements, close corporation and partnership relations, separation
agreements, individual employment contracts, license agreements, leases, estate
matters, contracts of government agencies and municipal bodies with private firms for
construction work, stock exchange transactions and controversies in the broad
insurance field, reinsurance arrangements, inter-insurance company subrogation
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arbitration either at the inception of their contractual relationship (by
including an arbitration clause in their contract) or when a particular
dispute arises. 192 Why would they choose to settle their disputes by
arbitration rather than conventional litigation? They do so principally
because arbitration is faster, cheaper, and less structured than
litigation. 193  Considerations favoring arbitration of commercial
disputes swell to their acme in jurisdictions where courts are
overwhelmed by ever-expanding caseloads.1 94
It is critical to appreciate, though, that the key to achieving the
benefits of arbitration is the expertise of the arbitrator. 195 Regardless
of how she is selected, the arbitrator will typically be someone with
special commercial knowledge rather than the general knowledge
possessed by a judge or a lay jury.196 Because the arbitrator is
familiar with commercial realities, she is better able to decide the case
in a way that accords with commercial expectations, practices, and
needs, even if this means "playing fast and loose" with specific
substantive law. 197 As one court eloquently put it, when parties
choose arbitration they "leave the issues to be determined in
claims, and in still newer areas such as uninsured motorist accident claims, as well as
those involving medical malpractice.
1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:01, at 3 (rev. ed. 2001).
192. See WILNER, supra note 191, § 1:01, at 1-2. It is fundamental that arbitration must be
agreed upon. See, e.g., Gen. Drivers Local Union No. 509 v. Ethyl Corp., 68 F.3d 80, 83 (4th Cir.
1995); Moss v. Am. Int'l Adjustment Co., 947 P.2d 371, 375 (Haw. 1997); Johnson v. Piper
Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Minn. 1995).
193. See, e.g., State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., 512 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Wis. 1994) (noting that
the advantage of arbitration over court actions "lies in the avoidance of formalities, delay, and
expense of litigation").
194. See WILNER, supra note 191, § 3:01, at 1. Specifically:
The burden on the courts caused by expanding caseloads and increasingly complex
issues in the commercial marketplace has lengthened the process of dispute resolution
in the courts. The delays inherent in judicial proceedings are often unacceptable to
those involved in modern commercial transactions and a simpler, faster method of
dispute resolution is required. Commercial arbitration is becoming the most widely
utilized alternative.
Id.
195. See id. § 20:00, at 301("The arbitrator is the decisive element in any arbitration. His
ability, expertness, and fairness are at the base of the arbitration process. The success or failure
of an arbitration will largely depend on him."); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68
A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982) ("A skilled arbitrator, acting as the trier, can digest evidence at his own
time and pace without the expensive panoply of the judicial process.").
196. See WILNER, supra note 191, § 20:00, at 301 ("Arbitrators may be selected by various
methods ranging from appointment under the rules of an agency administrating arbitration,
selection by the parties themselves, or designation by the court.").
197. See id. § 25:01, at 331 ("It is often said that the parties do not expect the arbitrators to
make their decision according to rules but rather, especially when the arbitrators are not
lawyers, on the basis of their experience, knowledge of the customs of the trade, and fair and
good sense for equitable relief.").
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accordance with the sense of justice and equity that they may believe
reposes in the breasts and minds of their self-chosen judges." 198
It was inevitable that the incentives for using arbitration
would ultimately lead to limits upon the right of a party to challenge
the arbitral award in court proceedings. Although judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions might be perceived, at least initially, as a
valuable safeguard against the misapplication of legal principles, it
seemed to defeat the goal of providing parties with a speedy,
inexpensive, and equitable alternative to litigation.199 Courts,
therefore, sharply circumscribed their own power of review by giving
deference to the arbitrator's factual findings and legal conclusions. 200
The idea that arbitrators, and not courts, are primarily responsible for
the rules of decision won legislative endorsement through the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 201 and in many state
198. Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St. Fashions, Inc., 139 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1955), affd, 128 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1955); see also Freydberg Bros. v. Corey, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10,
11 (1941) ("It is well settled that arbitrators are not bound by rules of law in determining issues
submitted to them, in the absence of an express contrary direction in the contract or
submission.").
199. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 960 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("Judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow because arbitration is intended to be
the final resolution of disputes."); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Transp.
Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Nothing would be more
destructive to arbitration than the perception that its finality depended upon the particular
perspectives of the judges who review the award."); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli
Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "an extremely low
standard of review is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added
preliminary step to judicial resolution .... ).
200. See, e.g., WILNER, supra note 191, § 33:06, at 26 ("The law is well settled that a court
may not review any of the finding of facts or application of law by the arbitrators, since they
involve matters of judgment, and it would be contrary to the intent of an arbitration agreement
for a court to interfere.").
201. Most arbitration claims, whether they are brought in federal or state court, are
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Section 10(a) of the FAA permits vacatur:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing
by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(1)-(5) (West 1999).
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statutes modeled on the Uniform Arbitration Act.202
This approach reflects a sound recognition that there are
considerations which may warrant limiting the extent to which a
party adversely affected by an arbitral decision may have that
decision reviewed. A principle of deference is especially appropriate in
the context of commercial arbitration because, (1) the parties
impliedly consented to a limited scope of review when they agreed to
submit their dispute to arbitration;2 3 (2) the initial decisionmaker's
competence to render an "accurate" judgment is at least equal to that
of the reviewing court; and (3) the decision in the case will have no
precedent-building character. The same considerations arise when
applying the principle of deference to issues of foreign law.
Finally, although parties seeking appellate review are
ubiquitous, the problem with lower court error may not be as severe as
the number of appellate cases would suggest. There is reason to
believe that many decisions are reversed on appeal not because the
lower court misunderstood or misapplied the controlling legal
principle, but precisely because the judgment was correct as a matter
of law. In these cases it is misleading to speak of "error of law" as the
ground for reversal. The lower court is reversed because it properly
obeyed hierarchical precedent and followed the decisions of a court
directly above it at a time when that court thought it appropriate to
diverge from precedent and devise a new rule.20 4 In short, this is the
type of "error" that a multitiered adjudicatory process will inevitably
generate if courts are to remain responsive to technological
developments and changes in business practices.
Appropriate de novo review of lower court decisions is essential
to the long-term development of the law because it creates the
opportunity for appellate courts to revisit and revise their own rulings.
Even so, this view does not justify de novo review when the law being
considered is the law of a foreign jurisdiction, the development of
which the reviewing court has no power to control. It is true that de
202. Thirty-five states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A."). The grounds for
challenging an arbitration award under the U.A.A. are generally the ones set forth in the FAA.
See UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 280 (1997).
203. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 299 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa. 1973) ("Mistakes of
judgment and mistakes of either fact or law are among the contingencies parties assume when
they submit disputes to arbitration.").
204. See WILNER, supra note 83, at 419 (citing K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 305 (1960)):
In constitutional and statutory interpretation and in the application of common law
principles, reversals of the decisions of lower courts result rarely for error. As Karl
Llewellyn observed, most reversals occur because the rule applied, sound enough in
its day, is no longer deemed to be of utility. Judgments are set aside not because they
fail to apply existing rules, but because they do.
[Vol. 56:57
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novo review of foreign law decisions may contribute to a valuable
continuing dialogue among judges from different jurisdictions. As
discussed above, however, the costs of judicial review are not
insignificant, and they provide a strong countervailing argument that
de novo review should be curtailed with respect to issues of foreign
law.205
V. Two ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DEALING WITH ISSUES OF FOREIGN
LAW
A policy of appellate deference would help relieve docket
pressure; yet even so, whether such a policy can be justified as a
suitable method of determining unsettled issues of foreign law turns,
in part, on whether there are more attractive alternatives. This part of
the Article identifies and evaluates two such alternatives and
concludes that neither supports prevailing doctrine. In short, a
deferential standard of review provides a better balance of the parties'
interests with the need to relieve appellate court burdens.
A. Application of the Local Law of the Forum
Rather than attempting to sort out the law of foreign
jurisdictions, a more fruitful alternative might be for the courts of the
forum state to do what they do best and decide cases in accordance
with local law. Exemplifying this approach is ROC-Century Associates
v. Guinta.20 6 In Guinta the secured creditor brought suit in Maine to
obtain a deficiency judgment against the debtor's estate.20 7  The
probate court enforced a provision in the promissory note calling for
the application of New York law and entered judgment for the secured
party notwithstanding its finding that the disposition of the collateral
was commercially unreasonable. 20 8 The court did so in the apparent
belief that New York had adopted the "rebuttable presumption" rule to
govern whether, and if so how, a secured party's noncompliance with
the enforcement provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. affects that
party's right to recover a deficiency. 20 9
205. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
206. 658 A.2d 223 (Me. 1995).
207. Id. at 225.
208. Id.
209. See id. Prior to the 1998 revision of Article 9, jurisdictions were split three ways as to
the effect of the secured creditor's failure to dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner on its right to recover a deficiency judgment: either (1) the creditor was permitted to
recover the deficiency, but the recovery was subject to a reduction for any damages provable by
the debtor under section 9-507; or (2) the creditor was absolutely barred from any recovery; or (3)
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On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed but did
not base its decision on New York law.210 Citing lower New York court
decisions advocating each of the three competing positions regarding
the remedial consequences of a commercially unreasonable sale,211 the
court concluded that there was simply no way to divine how New
York's highest court would resolve the issue if given the chance. 212
Because New York law was uncertain, the court looked instead to the
unsettled law of Maine as the forum state and was persuaded to adopt
the "rebuttable presumption" rule.213
The strongest argument against the ROC court's approach to
unresolved issues of foreign law is that it fails to properly take account
of the parties' expectations. 214 Imagine, for example, the following
scenario: Parties to a computer information transaction choose by
contract to have their relationship governed by the law of Virginia.
They do so solely because Virginia is one of only two states thus far to
have enacted U.C.I.T.A. 215 Sometime later, suit is brought in a
recovery was permitted to the extent that the creditor was able to overcome a rebuttable
presumption that the collateral's value equaled the amount of the debt. Robert M. Lloyd, The
Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sales: A Prescription for Waste, 40 UCLA L. REV. 695,
721-24 (1993). The 2001 version of Article 9 partially resolves the controversy by adopting the
"rebuttable presumption" rule for commercial transactions. See U.C.C. § 9-626(a) & cmt. 3
(2001). Revised Article 9 is silent on the appropriate rule for consumer transactions.
210. Id. at 226.
211. Guinta, 658 A.2d at 226 n.1.
212. Id. at 226.
213. Id. In concluding that the parties' choice-of-law agreement should be disregarded in
favor of the forum state's law, the supreme court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 cmt. h (1971). Comment h suggests the propriety of applying local law
when the party requesting the application of foreign law "has provided no information, or
insufficient information, about the foreign law." § 136 cmt. h.
214. Even the section 136 recognizes the paramount importance of the parties' expectations.
It provides in pertinent part:
The forum will.., not apply its local law in situations where insufficient information
has been provided about the foreign law if such application would not be in the
interests of justice. One factor that may induce the forum to refuse to apply its local
law is the likelihood that the foreign law differs from the local law of the forum and
that the parties relied on the foreign law in planning their transaction.... Another
factor that may induce the forum to refuse to apply its local law is the fact that the
applicable local law rule of the forum imposes a peculiar obligation.
§ 136 cmt. h.
215. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (Michie 2001). The other state is Maryland. MD.
CODE ANN. COM. LAW §§ 22-103 to -409 (2000). In the future, the parties may be able to use
Revised U.C.C. section 1-301 to validate their choice of U.C.I.T.A. or other foreign law. But that
section would apply only if their contract would otherwise be subject to the Code. See Rev. U.C.C.
§ 1-102 (2001) ("This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by any other
article of the [Uniform Commercial Code]"). So, for example, if the court were to refuse to
characterize the particular software contract as a sale of goods, see infra notes 216-17 and
accompanying text, section 1-301 would have no application. Clearly, if Article 2 did not cover
the underlying contract, no other article would. Today, an argument could be made that under
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non-U.C.I.T.A. state. The courts of that state refuse to apply
U.C.I.T.A. because application of the particular provision at issue is
uncertain and an authoritative Virginia source of statutory
interpretation is nonexistent. In that scenario, what law would be
applied? The answer depends upon the court's characterization of the
transaction. One possibility, assuming one party is required to deliver
something tangible to the other party (e.g., a computer diskette),
would be to treat the transaction as a sale of goods. Viewed this way,
the parties' relationship would be governed by Article 2 of the
U.C.C.216 Alternatively, the transaction could be viewed as a license of
intellectual property rights, with perhaps an incidental goods
component. If so, the applicable law would be the federal law of
intellectual property and the common law of licenses. 217 No matter
which alternative the court embraced, by refusing to enforce the
Virginia choice-of-law clause and apply U.C.I.T.A., the court would be
dragging the parties into a legal regime they clearly intended to avoid.
By agreeing to have their claims resolved under U.C.I.T.A., the parties
endorsed the values embodied in that statute-to provide clear,
consistent, and uniform rules governing the transition from a goods-
based economy to an information-based economy. 218  U.C.I.T.A.
the current version of the Code, the parties are free to have their relationship governed by
U.C.I.T.A. if they so choose. See Rev. U.C.C. § 1-302(a) ("[T]he effect of provisions of [the Uniform
Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement .. "). However, at least one state, Iowa, has
made itself a "U.C.I.T.A.-free zone" by enacting a statute "which declares voidable a choice of law
clause if the state law selected was UCITA." U.C.I.T.A. Online, What's Happening to UCITA in
the States, at http://www.U.C.I.T.A.online.com/whathap.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2002). Worries
that suit might be filed in Iowa or in some other state where U.C.I.T.A. has been held to be
against fundamental public policy could presumably be addressed by coupling the choice-of-law
clause with a forum selection clause.
216. For examples of cases that have applied Article 2 to software contracts, see Step-Saver
Data Sys. Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925
F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991); Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351
(D.N.J. 1992); Sys. Design & Mgmt. Info., Inc. v. Kan. City Post Office Employees Credit Union,
788 P.2d 878, 881 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Dreier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986).
217. For examples of cases that have refused to apply Article 2 to software contracts, see
Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Berthold Types
Ltd. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 697, 699 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Architronics, Inc. v. Control
Sys., Inc. 935 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
218. As Raymond T. Nimmer, the reporter for the U.C.I.T.A. drafting committee, described
it:
[1]n addition to the basic concept of contract choice, there is a special need in the field
of computer information transactions to allow the parties to clarify the source of
contract law within which their agreement should be handled. While UCITA provides
needed uniformity and coherence for these transactions, there may be cases in which
uncertainty arises about when and in what manner it, common law, or Article 2
governs. The ability to contractually choose allows the parties to avoid the cost and
uncertainty that would otherwise exist in such cases.
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represents a complex array of choices, promoting certain values while
subordinating others. These choices were the background that shaped
the parties' bargaining and from which they intended any default
rules to be drawn.
Since permitting the parties to determine by agreement what
contract law will govern their relationship increases net welfare by
ensuring the application of a legal framework that is consistent with
their expectations, needs, and understandings, it matters little that
the non-Virginia court is forced to "guess" at how Virginia's highest
court would apply U.C.I.T.A. in the circumstances. In choosing a
U.C.I.T.A. state's law, the parties consciously decided to gamble on the
resolution of any unsettled legal issue that might arise regardless of
where the case might be pending. At least if their choice-of-law
provision is honored, the general principles of U.C.I.T.A. will, to the
extent possible, guide the decisionmaking process. Thus, if courts are
predisposed to apply their own law when faced with uncertain foreign
law, this forum bias may indeed produce rules that do not fit the
realities of the transactions they govern. 219 On balance, then, though
the application of the law of the forum may provide the court with the
comfort of its own familiar law, this benefit is more than
counterbalanced by the cost to parties who can no longer use choice-of-
law clauses to facilitate planning, enhance certainty, and assure the
application of friendly law.
Moreover, forum bias where foreign law is uncertain produces
decisions with precedential value, so a deferential standard of review
would not be warranted. 220 The additional costs of appellate review
may therefore weigh heavily in the analysis, providing another reason
to apply foreign law notwithstanding its uncertainty.
B. Interstate Certification
Another, and perhaps more promising, alternative approach to
deciding unsettled questions of foreign law is interstate certification.
This device, which can be traced directly to the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,221 is "an issue-avoidance,
Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope
of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQUESNE L. REV. 255, 316 (2000).
219. Suppose, for example, that the court nullifies the parties' choice of U.C.I.T.A. as their
source of law and instead applies Article 2. As one commentator has bluntly put it: "Applying
Article 2 to a software transaction.., is a disaster." Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply
to Software Transactions, 38 DUQUESNE L. REV. 459, 579 (2000).
220. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
221. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). English law has long recognized certification. See British
Ascertainment Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., c, 63 (Eng.) (9 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 582
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decision-ducking technique" that empowers a court in one
jurisdictional system to obtain authoritative answers to unclear or
unresolved questions of foreign law from the highest court of the
relevant foreign jurisdiction. 222 In the immediate aftermath of Erie,
when state law was unclear, many federal courts, rather than risking
incorrect determinations, chose to abstain from exercising their
jurisdiction until the state court was given an opportunity to resolve
the state law issue.223 Although this practice of abstention helps to
solve the problem of ascertaining state substantive law, it was not
without serious drawbacks. In a nutshell, abstention inevitably caused
excessive delay and a substantial increase in the costs of litigation 224
and was widely criticized for these (and other) reasons. 225
Certification was conceived as an alternative to abstention. 226
Although forty-three states, Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico have
(2d ed. 1949) (permitting certifications within the British Empire); the Foreign Law
Ascertainment Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 11 (Eng.) (9 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 584
(2d ed. 1949) (permitting certifications to foreign states).
222. See Paul A. LaBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19
GA. L. REV. 999, 1003 (1985).
223. See, e.g., United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1964) (en
banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964). The abstention doctrine was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (recognizing that
abstention is appropriate if resolution of the state law issue could avoid the need to decide an
issue of federal constitutional law) and subsequently reaffirmed in Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (stating that abstention is appropriate if the dispute
"intimately involve[s] ... [the state's] sovereign prerogative"). For a discussion of how abstention
works in practice, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (4th ed. 1983).
224. When a federal court abstains, the parties are forced to bring what amounts to a
separate, concurrent suit in the state court system. See WRIGHT, supra note 223; John B. Corr &
Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 416
(1988) (concluding that "abstention imposes duplicative litigation on federal and state trial
courts and also imposes a tax on the public treasury"); Richard B. Lillich & Raymond T. Mundy,
Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888, 890 n.22
(1971). It is therefore not surprising that this practice can delay final resolution of the case for
many years. See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (delayed six
years); Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (delayed seven years).
225. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas made a point to give "renewed protest to [the] practice of making litigants travel
a long, expensive road in order to obtain justice." Id.; see also Memorandum from the New York
Law Revision Commission Relating to Certification of Questions of Law, to the Court of Appeals
6 (1984) ("The expense and delay caused by proceeding through the lower state courts up to the
highest state court can make abstention an onerous burden on litigants."); see generally Martin
H. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of "Democracy Bashing, " 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1023 (1990). Abstention has also been criticized as violating the separation of
powers doctrine. See Kelly D. Hickman, Note, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of
Citizenship Cases, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1254-56 (1989).
226. See Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979) ("The
growth of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act has largely been a response to the
Abstention Doctrine, which was a necessary outgrowth of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."). Some of
the commentators who have praised certification as a more efficient alternative to abstention
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adopted some form of certification procedure, 227 only twelve states
permit certification from one state to another.228 It is not immediately
apparent why most states chose not to include an explicit provision for
interstate certification in their certification statutes. It is clear,
though, that certification between state courts has rarely, if ever, been
used.229 That the practice is so much more prevalent in federal courts
points to several characteristics of certification that make it more
suitable there and less likely ever to play a significant role in the
state-to-state context.
For one thing, certification between states does not produce as
much value as certification for federal courts. The main value of
certification in any context is that a definitive answer to an uncertain
question of law is given by a court with final authority to determine
the substance of that law. The nature of federal court dockets tends to
magnify the importance of certification. Since federal courts deal
primarily with federal law issues, they are more likely to rely on and
benefit from certification than are state courts with existing expertise
in matters of state law generally. 230
Further, certification is said to promote a "cooperative judicial
federalism" by allowing states to develop their own substantive law
without federal court interference. 231 Interference by another state
include LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201 n.18 (2d ed. 1988); John A.
Scanelli, Note, The Case for Certification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 639 (1971); J. Skelly
Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317,
325 (1967).
227. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CERTIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 15-24 (1995).
228. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 224, at 431 n.95 (noting that "most legislatures that
have enacted certification statutes have excised the language of the [Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act] that permits courts of other states to certify questions").
229. See id. ("Even in the jurisdictions that will hear certified questions from another state,
however, there are no published opinions indicating that any use has been made of the
opportunity.").
230. Corr and Robbins surmise that this may be one explanation as to why interstate
certification has not been used.
[Perhaps] state courts feel less need to certify questions because they perceive
themselves as having greater expertise in another state's law than a federal court is
likely to have. State courts, after all, routinely deal in matters of state law, and so are
likely to know more about state law generally than would federal courts, in which
federal questions predominate on the docket. Such familiarity might increase a state
court's confidence in its ability to divine the law of another state without resorting to
certification.
Id. at 431-32.
231. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (stating that certification
"helps build a cooperative judicial federalism"); Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative
Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 (1960) (stating
that certification is "a demonstration of cooperative judicial federalism which would justify those
of us who think that the federal form of government has a contribution to make toward the
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court does not threaten a state's sovereignty in matters of local law to
the same degree. When a State A court opines on the law of State B, in
other words, it is doubtful that anyone would rely on that opinion as
correctly stating the law of State B. Federal court opinions, however,
are probably not taken with the same grain of salt.232
Finally, certification permits an authoritative determination of
state law and promotes federalism. Although both certification and
abstention serve these purposes well, abstention, because of its costs,
is not quite as efficient. 233  Permitting federal courts to certify
questions of a state's law directly to its highest court undercuts to a
great degree the need for federal courts to rely on the less efficient
abstention doctrine. In the state-to-state context, there is no
alternative practice comparable to federal court abstention. However,
a kind of bias in favor of local law sometimes appears when state
courts are faced with difficult questions of foreign law. 234  If
certification tends to check this bias, it is valuable. 235 Yet the fact that
certification has not been used in these situations even when
permitted suggests that if we wish to find a palliative against forum
bias, we should look elsewhere. Indeed, whatever the true value of
certification, one point may be made: The value is not likely to be large
in the context of state-to-state certification. Though in general
certification is quite beneficial, it rests on an array of supporting
factors, not one of which is likely to have equal weight outside the
context of federal-to-state certification.
preservation of justice in this country"); Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification:
Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 350 (1963)
(certification "represents a more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism, since concern
for state sovereignty is implemented through a more efficient and simpler proceeding.").
232. Consider the observations of the Ohio Supreme Court:
The state's sovereignty is unquestionably implicated when federal courts construe
state law. If the federal court errs, it applies law other than Ohio law, in derogation of
the state's right to prescribe a "rule of decision." "By allocating rights and duties
incorrectly, the federal court does both an injustice to one or more parties, and
frustrates the state's policy that would have allocated the rights and duties
differently. The frustration of the state's policy may have a more lasting effect,
because other potential litigants are likely to behave as if the federal decision were
the law of the state. In that way, the federal court has, at least temporarily, made
state law of which the state would have disapproved, had its courts had the first
opportunity to pass on the question."
Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio 1991) (citations omitted).
233. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
235. See Corr & Robbins, supra note 224, at 458 (suggesting that "when a state court's
choice-of-law rules might normally direct the court to apply the law of another state, certification
can discover what the foreign law is and thus can be a strong and useful disincentive to the
inappropriate application of forum law-i.e., forum bias").
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In contrast to its value, the public and private costs of
certification are constant, regardless of whether the device is
employed in the federal or state context. As to litigants, the costs are
obvious: they arise because certification brings the litigation to a
temporary halt in one court system and shifts the action to another
court system, where litigants must brief and argue the case before
returning to the original court system to resume the litigation.23 6
There is no question that using two court systems to resolve one case
has the effect of generating additional expense and delay.237 But how
much? At least two empirical studies show that certification generally
delays the final resolution of cases longer than one year.238
The private costs alone caution restraint by courts in the
exercise of certification procedures, but there is also a public cost: each
time a question is certified, it adds another case to already
overburdened state supreme court dockets. 239 To be sure, the data do
not suggest that federal court certifications have made it difficult for
state courts to do their jobs effectively. But the bulk of the data shows
that certified questions do comprise a regular component of their
caseloads. 240  That being so, it has been suggested that a state
236. See In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (Wash. 1968) (Hale, J., dissenting).
237. See, e.g., Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need
for an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2137-
38, 2143-45 (1999) (recognizing that one of the most significant objections to certification is "the
additional cost and delay it imposes on the parties"); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie:
Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 332-33 (1994) (discussing the delay that
results from certification); Corr & Robbins, supra note 224, at 429-30 ("Perhaps the best way to
approach the significant problems of delay and corresponding expense in certification is to
recognize that they are inherent in the process .... ).
238. See Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the
Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 726 (1969) (indicating a delay of more
than one year); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91
HARv. L. REV. 317, 326-27 (1977) (noting that certification causes an average delay of fifteen
months). But see CARROLL SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF
FEDERAL JUDGES 15-16 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1983) (finding a median time period of 6.36 months
from certification to obtaining the state court's answer); Corr & Robbins, supra note 224, at 453
(in a survey of six state supreme court clerks, four indicated a response time of three to six
months; one clerk indicated that the time period was six to nine months; and one clerk indicated
that the time period was nine to twelve months).
239. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 237, at 2145 (indicating that "certification proposals have
been meet with concern that federal courts will be quick to employ the procedure and that the
resulting flood of cases will inundate and overburden the state's highest court"); Yonover, supra
note 237, at 322 ("Perhaps the fact that such populous states as California, Pennsylvania, and
New Jersey have not yet adopted certification procedures can be explained by the relatively large
number of federal district court filings and an unwillingness to add to already overburdened
state supreme court dockets.").
240. See, e.g., Corr & Robbins, supra note 224, at 452 (explaining that a survey of six
supreme court clerks indicated "that certification increases the highest state court's caseload by
less than five percent a year"); Smith, supra note 237, at 2146 ("In Florida, for example,... the
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supreme court can always choose not to answer the question certified
if its docket is overburdened. 241 But this suggestion misses the point,
because in each case, the highest court would nevertheless be
burdened by the necessity of having to decide whether to make that
choice.
By now, it seems clear that the costs of certification are
considerable and that while it is viewed as a better procedure than its
main alternative, abstention, 242 its use has its greatest value in the
federal-to-state context. In any case, the overall potential value of
certification in the state-to-state context is at least an open question.
Even if state court use of the device were to grow, its effect on the
workloads facing state appellate courts would not alone be sufficient
to eliminate the problem. A deferential standard of review would still
be a very plausible method of resolving questions of foreign law that
are either not certified at all or, although certified, remain
unanswered.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is only within the past decade or so that professional
organizations interested in making the law better suited to
commercial transactions have begun to advocate the proposition that
contracting parties should have broad power to choose "unrelated" law
to govern their relationships. One consequence of permitting almost
unlimited contractual choice of law is likely to be that a much larger
percentage of appellate court caseloads will be comprised of matters
involving issues of foreign law. Further, in light of their expanding
dockets, these same appellate courts have been compelled to operate
under conditions that are anything but conducive to the best
administration of justice. Faced with these developments, and in view
of the essential functions of appellate adjudication, appellate courts
should strive for greater efficiency in handling their caseloads by
modifying the standard of review generally applicable to pure
questions of law. A standard of deference when the law is foreign to
the forum jurisdiction would improve the operation of appellate courts
while appropriately distributing authority among all levels of the
number of cases certified to the Florida Supreme Court ranged.., from one to ten, with an
average of 4.875 cases per year.").
241. See M. Bryan Schneider, "But Answer Came There None": The Michigan Supreme Court
and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 273, 297 (1995) ("[T]he power to
answer the certified question is [within] the answering court's discretion under every
certification provision, [and therefore] the state supreme court can simply refuse to answer the
question if its docket is overburdened.").
242. See supra note 226.
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judiciary. To be sure, such reform is not a panacea for docket pressure;
nevertheless, it has promise as a means for improving appellate court
justice in the near term. In the broadest view, it would be a
manifestation of the need for our legal institutions to grow and adapt
to the changing legal landscape without sacrificing the public's
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A number of commentators in recent years have suggested permit-
ting holders of intellectual property rights to give up these rights in
exchange for cash prizes from the government. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Abramowicz shows that each of the proposals has significant
flaws that would make implementation impractical and argues that
no single perfect formula or algorithm for determining the size of
prizes exists. A prize system is nonetheless worth pursuing because it
could increase social welfare significantly by eliminating dead-
weight loss. Professor Abramowicz recommends a relatively simple
approach that would complement rather than replace the patent sys-
tem. The proposal is to establish an agency to distribute a fund that
would be used to reward corporate efforts to reduce the monopoly
effects of patent rights. A grant of wide agency discretion has sig-
nificant advantages and few drawbacks. Even assuming the agency
is likely to do a poor job of distributing prizes, the system will be
efficient if no biases in granting prizes are predictable. Whether or
not an agency is given complete discretion, increased flexibility and
careful design of information revelation mechanisms would enhance
the existing proposals for patent prizes.
